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THE BATTLE OVER U.S. WATER:             
WHY THE CLEAN WATER RULE       
“FLOWS” WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF 
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
ASHLEIGH ALLIONE* 
For close to thirty years, the U.S. government and courts have struggled to 
determine the scope of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”).  The CWA is the primary 
federal statute that regulates pollution of our nation’s waters, vaguely defined 
by Congress as the “waters of the United States.”  A body of water defined as a 
“water of the United States” is subject to the Act’s jurisdiction and permit 
requirements.  On June 29, 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency and 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issued a long-awaited rule—the Clean Water 
Rule—redefining the “waters of the United States.”  This Rule has led to 
widespread controversy among landowners, state governments, and 
environmental groups who are challenging its validity and scope.  At one 
extreme, landowners are concerned about increased federal regulation over 
private property and the need for costly permits prior to development or use; at 
the other, environmental groups contend that the Rule is not strong enough to 
protect our nation’s crucial waterways from pollution.  This Comment 
analyzes the Clean Water Rule and argues that it falls within the permissible 
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scope of CWA jurisdiction and comports with Supreme Court precedent.  This 
Comment further contends that the Rule was a good faith attempt to 
streamline the permit process and provide the public with increased clarity on 
the scope of the “waters of the United States.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States is currently engaged in a nationwide battle over 
how to define the “waters of the United States.”1  On June 29, 2015, 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers (“Corps” and together with the EPA, the 
“Agencies”) jointly published the much-anticipated final Clean Water 
Rule that defines the “waters of the United States”—a term that 
determines the scope of waters protected under the Clean Water Act 
(CWA).2  Following its publication, the Rule has faced nationwide 
criticism from state and local officials, businesses, associations, and 
environmental advocates who have questioned the Rule’s legality and 
claimed that the Rule constitutes federal overreach.3  While disputes 
about water ownership and use have existed since our nation’s 
founding, this particular controversy has become the most 
contentious water debate for close to half a century.4 
The Clean Water Rule (“the Rule”), also commonly referred to as 
the “WOTUS”5 Rule, will replace the existing definition in the 
Agencies’ regulations, which has been in effect for more than twenty-
five years.6  The Rule seeks to clarify which waters are protected 
under the CWA and thus fall within the Agencies’ regulatory 
                                                          
 1. See Susan K. Hori, New “Waters of the US” Rule on Hold:  Enduring Debate Creates 
Uncertainty for Developers, ENVTL. LEADER (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.environmentalle 
ader.com/2015/12/14/new-waters-of-the-us-rule-on-hold-enduring-debate-creates-
uncertainty-for-developers (chronicling the interpretation of the phrase “waters of 
the United States” since 1985). 
 2. Clean Water Rule:  Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 
37,054 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.). 
 3. See CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43943, EPA AND THE ARMY 
CORPS’ “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES” RULE:  CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE AND OPTIONS 
1 (2016) [hereinafter COPELAND, R43943], https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R439 
43.pdf (noting that critics argue that the Rule’s vagueness opens the door for 
increased regulatory jurisdiction). 
 4. See Jeremy P. Jacobs & Annie Snider, “Mr. Clean Water Act” Faces Biggest 
Challenge, GREENWIRE (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060025570 
(“I personally, in 30 years, have never experienced anything like this. . . . I’m not sure 
the division has.  I’m not sure the Department of Justice has.  So many challenges in 
district courts to the same agency action.  And so many challenges in courts of 
appeals.” (quoting Department of Justice Attorney Steve Samuels)). 
 5. WOTUS is an abbreviation for “waters of the United States.”  Id. 
 6. CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43455, EPA AND THE ARMY 
CORPS’ RULE TO DEFINE “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES” 1 (2016) [hereinafter 
COPELAND, R43455], https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43455.pdf.  For the 
Agencies’ definition of “waters of the United States” used between November 13, 
1986, and August 27, 2015, see generally 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (1986) (Corps); 40 C.F.R. 
§ 122.2 (1986) (EPA). 
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authority, or jurisdiction.  If a body of water is determined to be a 
“water of the United States,” the Agencies may require businesses and 
individuals to obtain federal CWA permits prior to development or 
use.7  The Rule defines several types of protected waters for the first 
time and redefines categories of waters that the Agencies previously 
considered jurisdictional on a case-by-case basis.8  As a result, the Rule 
expands federal jurisdiction over some categories of water and could 
increase determinations that a body of water is a “water of the United 
States,” subject to federal regulation, by three to five percent.9 
Consequently, the Rule’s new definition has raised fears about 
increased permit requirements and federal regulation over water on 
private property and intrastate land.10  The concerns surrounding the 
Rule stem from the facts that (1) federal CWA permit applications 
are time-consuming and costly and (2) failure to obtain a permit 
before discharging pollutants into jurisdictional waters may result in 
civil and criminal liability that carries potentially substantial fines.11  
Landowners, companies, and state governments have expressed 
concerns about the potential for increased costs associated with 
agriculture, development, or state projects near waters newly 
protected under the Rule because they would need to comply with 
CWA permit requirements or risk liability.12 
                                                          
 7. COPELAND, R43455, supra note 6, at 1.  The Rule defines the “waters of the 
United States” for all CWA regulatory programs that use this term.  Id. at 2.  
However, this Comment will focus on the Rule’s impact on the section 404 regulatory 
program.  See infra text accompanying notes 56–62 (explaining the EPA and Corps’ 
regulatory permit programs). 
 8. See infra text accompanying notes 169–83 (explaining the changes in the Rule). 
 9. COPELAND, R43455, supra note 6, at 11. 
 10. See Jenny Hopkinson, Obama’s Water War, POLITICO (May 27, 2015, 10:41 AM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/05/epa-waterways-wetlands-rule-118319 
(declaring that “the federal government shouldn’t be regulating puddles on private 
property” and describing the Rule as “a raw and tyrannical power grab” that will lead 
“to a regulatory and economic hell”). 
 11. See infra notes 61–62 and accompanying text (describing the costs associated 
with section 404 permits); see, e.g., Jeremy P. Jacobs, Regulatory Showdown in Calif. 
Wheat Field, E&E REP. (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060031808 
(providing a first-hand account of the Rule’s potential liability implications). 
 12. See Timothy Benson, Sixth Circuit Provides Bridge over Troubled WOTUS, HILL:  
CONGRESS BLOG (Oct. 28, 2015, 2:30 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/e 
nergy-environment/258287-sixth-circuit-provides-bridge-over-troubled-wotus 
(explaining that the Rule leads to increased restrictions, red tape, and costs if an 
owner’s land protected by the Rule is minimally altered and commenting that the 
Rule leads to a “usurpation of states’ authority”); COPELAND, R43455, supra note 6, at 
1 (discussing the reaction of state and local officials who are concerned about the 
Rule affecting their own infrastructure projects). 
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The CWA, enacted in 1972, is the primary federal statute 
regulating pollution of the U.S. waterways.13  The CWA granted the 
federal government the authority to regulate the discharge of 
pollutants into “navigable waters,” which Congress broadly defined as 
the “waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”14  The 
Agencies were left to define the scope of the “waters of the United 
States” in future regulations.15  The Agencies have always had the 
authority to regulate traditional navigable waters—waters used or 
with the capacity for use in commerce.16  However, the Agencies and 
courts have struggled to determine how far CWA jurisdiction extends 
to non-navigable streams, wetlands, and adjacent waters that are not 
directly connected to traditional navigable waters.17  These non-
navigable and adjacent waters account for approximately sixty 
percent of our nation’s streams and wetlands, leading to inconsistent 
application of the CWA among Agency officials and to confusion 
among the regulated public.18 
Confusion about CWA jurisdiction continued following three 
United States Supreme Court cases that ambiguously interpreted the 
scope of the CWA:  United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,19 Solid 
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers20 
(“SWANCC”), and the most recent case, Rapanos v. United States.21  The 
Court failed to reach a majority decision in Rapanos, which addressed 
CWA jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to non-navigable tributaries.22  
This decision led to two standards that the Agencies and courts have 
                                                          
 13. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (CWA), Pub. L. 
No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012)). 
 14. CWA § 502(7); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). 
 15. COPELAND, R43943, supra note 3, at 3; see supra note 6 (discussing the 
regulations passed by the Corps and EPA in 1986). 
 16. ROYAL C. GARDNER, LAWYERS, SWAMPS, AND MONEY:  U.S. WETLAND LAW, POLICY, 
AND POLITICS 38 (2011). 
 17. See, e.g., COPELAND, R43455, supra note 6, at 3 (referencing the ambiguity of 
the extent of the CWA’s scope of jurisdiction and supporters’ acknowledgment that 
the scope needed clarification). 
 18. Clean Water Rule:  Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 
37,054, 37,056 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts of 40 
C.F.R.); Factsheet:  Clean Water Rule, EPA (2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/producti 
on/files/2015-05/documents/fact_sheet_summary_final_1.pdf [hereinafter Factsheet]. 
 19. 474 U.S. 121 (1985). 
 20. 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
 21. 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (plurality opinion). 
 22. Id. at 729. 
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applied to establish CWA jurisdiction.23  The plurality opinion held 
that waters are jurisdictional under the CWA if they have a “continuous 
surface connection” with a “water of the United States.”24  In a separate 
concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy created a different test, which 
established CWA jurisdiction only if there is a “significant nexus” 
between the two bodies of water.25  To date, there has been no 
consensus on whether the plurality’s standard or Justice Kennedy’s 
“significant nexus” test is the appropriate standard to find a body of 
water or wetland jurisdictional as a “water of the United States.”26 
In the wake of Rapanos, the EPA received hundreds of requests 
from elected officials, local agency associations, nongovernmental 
organizations, and businesses seeking clarification on the scope of 
the “waters of the United States.”27  On April 21, 2014, the Agencies 
issued a proposed rule to clarify which bodies of water they 
considered to be “waters of the United States,”28 and that proposal 
received over one million public comments.29  Following review of the 
public comments, the final revised rule was published on June 29, 
2015, and became effective on August 28, 2015.30  The Rule clarifies 
                                                          
 23. Joshua A. Bloom & Estie A. Manchik, Defining “Significant Nexus” After 
Rapanos, 39 TRENDS 1, 4 (2008). 
 24. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742 (explaining that a “continuous surface connection” occurs 
when it is difficult to determine “where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins”). 
 25. Id. at 779 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 26. See infra Section I.C (explaining the disagreement among federal courts over 
the appropriate standard post-Rapanos). 
 27. Persons and Organizations Requesting Clarification of “Waters of the United States” by 
Rulemaking, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/cleanwaterrule/persons-and-organizations-
requesting-clarification-waters-united-states-rulemaking (last visited Oct. 19, 2016) 
[hereinafter EPA Requests]. 
 28. Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 
Fed. Reg. 22,188 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014). 
 29. See Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 
REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OW-2011-
0880 (last visited Oct. 19, 2016) (providing access to the public comments submitted 
following the Proposed Rule). 
 30. Clean Water Rule:  Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 
37,054 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts of 40 
C.F.R.).  However, the U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota issued an 
order enjoining implementation of the Clean Water Rule the day before the Rule 
was to become effective nationwide.  North Dakota v. EPA, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 
1060 (D.N.D. 2015).  On September 4, 2015, the North Dakota District Court 
confirmed that its Order only prevented implementation of the Rule in the thirteen 
states—Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming—that were parties 
to the litigation.  Order Limiting the Scope of Preliminary Injunction to Plaintiffs, 
North Dakota v. EPA, 3:15-cv-59, (D.N.D. Sept. 4, 2015), ECF No. 79.  Thus, the Rule 
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the CWA’s jurisdiction over this ambiguous category of waters, which 
includes waters used for fishing, swimming, and wildlife habitation, as 
well as streams that affect drinking water for roughly 117 million 
Americans.31  Nevertheless, some environmental advocates believe 
that the Rule falls short of its goals because it increases permit 
exemptions and fails to protect other important categories of water, 
such as groundwater.32 
The Agencies insist that the scope of jurisdiction under the Rule is 
actually narrower than existing regulations.33  Despite this assurance, 
litigation has plagued the Rule at both the district and appellate 
levels, and, on October 9, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit stayed enforcement of the Rule nationwide.34  
Moreover, Congress has made several attempts to block the Rule’s 
implementation.35  While this is not the first opposition that the CWA 
has faced,36 the strong immediate reaction from both environmental 
and industry groups following the Rule’s publication has sparked a 
                                                          
went into effect on August 28, 2015, for the remaining states that were not parties to 
the litigation.  Id. 
 31. Factsheet, supra note 18. 
 32. Tina Posterli, US EPA and Army Corps Issue Weak Clean Water Rule, 
WATERKEEPER ALLIANCE (May 27, 2015), http://waterkeeper.org/us-epa-and-army-cor 
ps-issue-weak-clean-water-rule (referencing arguments by environmental groups); see 
also Kelli Barrett, Mixed Initial Responses to Final US Clean Water Rule, ECOSYSTEM 
MARKETPLACE (May 29, 2015), http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/articles/mix 
ed-initial-responses-to-final-us-clean-water-rule (discussing the Rule’s shortcomings). 
 33. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,054 (noting that the Rule adds 
“important qualifiers on some existing categories such as tributaries”). 
 34. See In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804, 806 (6th Cir. 2015) (staying enforcement of the 
Rule pending the litigation consolidated in the Sixth Circuit); In re Clean Water 
Rule:  Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 140 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1341 
(J.P.M.L. 2015) (rejecting consolidation of nine complaints filed in district courts 
nationwide); In re Final Rule:  Clean Water Rule:  Definition of “Waters of the United 
States,” Consolidation Order, MCP No. 135 (J.P.M.L. July 28, 2015), Dkt. No. 3 
(consolidating twelve petitions for review in the Sixth Circuit). 
 35. See, e.g., H.R. 1732, 114th Cong. (2015) (requiring, upon passage of the Act, 
the withdrawal of any final rule based on the 2014 proposed rule); S.J. Res. 22, 114th 
Cong. (2015) (proposing to nullify the Clean Water Rule published on June 29, 
2015).  On January 19, 2016, President Barack Obama vetoed Joint Resolution 22, 
which would have overturned the Rule.  Daniel Wilson, Senate Fails to Block Obama’s 
Veto of Anti-Water Rule Bill, LAW360 (Jan. 21, 2016, 11:59 AM), http://www.law360.co 
m/articles/749073/senate-fails-to-block-obama-s-veto-of-anti-water-rule-bill.  The 
House and Senate have not garnered enough support to override President Obama’s 
veto.  Id. 
 36. In 1972, Congress had to override a veto by President Richard Nixon to 
implement the CWA.  JOEL M. GROSS & KERRI L. STELCEN, BASIC PRACTICE SERIES:  
CLEAN WATER ACT 7 (2d ed. 2012). 
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contentious debate regarding its legality, resulting in a prolonged, 
uphill battle for the Agencies.37 
This Comment analyzes the Rule and argues that the Rule falls 
within the permissible scope of CWA jurisdiction and does not violate 
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Riverside Bayview, SWANCC, or 
Rapanos.38  Further, this Comment argues that the Rule was a good 
faith effort by the Obama Administration to streamline review of the 
CWA permit process and make the scope of CWA jurisdiction easier 
for the public to understand.  The Rule reflects Congress’s intent 
behind the CWA, a combination of Supreme Court precedent, recent 
science, Agency practice, and consideration of public comments. 
Part I of this Comment provides a brief history of the CWA and the 
recent Supreme Court decisions in Riverside Bayview, SWANCC, and 
Rapanos addressing the scope of the CWA.  It also discusses the 
diverse U.S. Courts of Appeals interpretations of CWA jurisdiction 
following Rapanos and introduces the text of the Rule.  Part II 
analyzes the Rule and asserts that the Rule adopts Justice Kennedy’s 
“significant nexus” standard into the definition of “waters of the 
United States.”  Further, Part II analyzes the Rule’s three categories 
of CWA jurisdiction and argues that each of these categories 
comports with the permissible scope of CWA jurisdiction under 
Supreme Court precedent.  Finally, this Comment concludes that the 
Rule provides the public with increased clarity about the scope of 
jurisdictional waters under the CWA and is important to ensure 
protection of our nation’s waters. 
I. HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE CONTROVERSY OVER 
THE “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES” 
The Agencies and courts have struggled to interpret the 
jurisdictional scope of the CWA since its implementation.  The 
                                                          
 37. See Garret Ellison, Michigan Unique in Clean Water Rule Debate Due to 1984 
Wetland Program, MLIVE MEDIA GROUP (Sept. 14, 2015, 8:30 AM), http://www.mlive.co 
m/news/index.ssf/2015/09/clean_water_rule_michigan_wotu.html (describing 
disagreement over the Rule and the conflicting responses by the Obama 
Administration, Congress, and numerous states); Jennifer Yachnin, House Republican 
Compares WOTUS to Terrorism, the Plague, GREENWIRE (Nov. 23, 2015), 
http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060028451 (“In the farming community, 
which both Republicans and Democrats represent, this is as popular as the plague, as 
popular as ISIS.  This is not popular at all.” (quoting Rep. Ken Calvert)). 
 38. This Comment will only analyze the Rule in light of the past CWA Supreme 
Court cases and will not address any other constitutional arguments that have been 
raised in litigation. 
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development of the new Rule defining “waters of the United States” 
resulted from confusion regarding three Supreme Court cases—
Riverside Bayview, SWANCC, and Rapanos—that ambiguously 
interpreted the Agencies’ authority to regulate adjacent waters and 
smaller, non-navigable streams under the CWA.  This Part expounds 
on the history of the CWA and the development of the Rule by 
discussing the Supreme Court cases and explaining both the 
Agencies’ and courts’ difficulty determining the appropriate standard 
to establish CWA jurisdiction following Rapanos. 
A. The History and Purpose of the Clean Water Act 
The Agencies consider the CWA to be “the Nation’s single most 
important statute for protecting America’s clean water against 
pollution, degradation, and destruction.”39  In 1972, Congress 
enacted the CWA in amendments to the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act (“FWPCA”).40  The CWA’s stated objective was “to restore 
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation’s waters” with the national goal “that the discharge of 
pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985.”41  
However, this was a lofty goal given that two-thirds of our nation’s 
waters had been deemed no longer safe for swimming or fishing.42 
Prior to the CWA’s enactment, Congress had made numerous 
attempts to regulate water pollution beginning in the 1890s.43  At that 
time, Congress was focused primarily on pollution that affected 
navigation.44  In 1948, in an effort to expand protection in light of 
                                                          
 39. Clean Water Rule:  Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 
37,054, 37,055 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts of 40 
C.F.R.). 
 40. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1251–1387 (2012)). 
 41. CWA § 101(a); 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). 
 42. Troubled Waters:  A Brief History of the Clean Water Act, NOW (Dec. 20, 2002), 
http://www.pbs.org/now/science/cleanwater.html (noting that in 1969, pollution of 
America’s waters with discharge, such as untreated sewage, had killed record 
numbers of fish and had caused bacteria levels to rise to 170 times the safe limit in 
the Hudson River). 
 43. One of the earliest efforts of federal water regulation was the Rivers and 
Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 (“RHA”), which prohibited the discharge of 
“refuse matter . . . flowing from streets and sewers . . . into any navigable water of the 
United States” and granted authority to the Corps to regulate and issue permits.  
GROSS & STELCEN, supra note 36, at 5 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 407) (describing how the 
RHA became a mechanism for regulating water pollution). 
 44. See id. (explaining how the RHA was an attempt to reduce discharge that had 
hampered the “navigable capacity” of the nation’s waters). 
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increased industrialization, Congress enacted the FWPCA.45  The 
FWPCA left implementation and enforcement to state-led initiatives.46  
However, by 1971, only half of the states had approved water quality 
standards, leaving the federal government without any enforcement 
authority.47  Ultimately, observers viewed this regulatory scheme as 
ineffective due to its limited scope of authority and inadequate 
mechanisms of enforcement.48  Thus, in 1972, Congress comprehensively 
amended the FWPCA to cover this “widening gap in federal legislation.”49  
The amendments contained a “comprehensive legislative anti-pollution 
scheme,” which became commonly known as the CWA.50 
The CWA was a landmark congressional response to the lack of 
adequate enforcement of water pollution legislation and increased 
environmental awareness nationwide.51  Representatives referred to the 
                                                          
 45. Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1251–1376).  But see Heather Keith, Comment, United States v. Rapanos:  Is 
“Waters of the United States” Necessary for Clean Water Act Jurisdiction?, 3 SETON HALL CIR. 
REV. 565, 573 (2007) (detailing that many waters were left unprotected and polluted 
under the RHA’s regulatory scheme). 
 46. GROSS & STELCEN, supra note 36, at 6 (discussing the confined supporting 
role of the federal government in the 1948 FWPCA due to the delegation of 
enforcement to the state level).  Further, in an attempt to strengthen the FWPCA, 
Congress enacted the Water Quality Act of 1965, which required “each state . . . to 
develop standards for water quality within its state boundaries by July 1, 1967.”  Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK 1 (Mark A. Ryan ed., 3d ed. 2011) 
[hereinafter CWA HANDBOOK]. 
 49. Keith, supra note 45, at 573 (noting that the Corps could not indefinitely 
expand the interpretation of its jurisdiction under the RHA to regulate water 
pollution); see Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (CWA), 
Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 
(2012)).  While the RHA had tied “the Corps[’] objectives to solely protect the 
physical navigability of the nation’s waterways, the CWA expanded the Corps’ focus 
to address critical issues of pollution” by including objectives that were not solely tied 
to navigability.  Keith, supra note 45, at 575. 
 50. Keith, supra note 45, at 573.  In 1972, the official title of the CWA was the 
“Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments”; however, after further 
amendments in 1977, the law and its subsequent amendments became known as the 
“Clean Water Act.”  Federal Water Pollution Control Act (1972) or the Clean Water Act (CWA), 
BUREAU OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., http://www.boem.gov/Environmental-
Stewardship/Environmental-Assessment/CWA/index.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2016). 
 51. See GROSS & STELCEN, supra note 36, at 6–7 (detailing the degradation of the 
nation’s waters and the effect of the changing national consciousness on the 
implementation of the CWA).  For example, several serious pollution events 
occurred in 1969, including an oil spill off the coast of Santa Barbara, California, and 
a fire on the polluted Cuyahoga River in Ohio.  Id. at 7.  A year later, the first Earth 
Day took place in 1970, and in 1972 the CWA was enacted.  Id. 
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Act as “the most comprehensive and far-reaching water pollution bill 
[Congress had] ever drafted.”52  In fact, Senator Randolph, Chairman of 
the Committee on Public Works, stated that it was “perhaps the most 
comprehensive legislation that the Congress of the United States has 
ever developed in this particular field of the environment.”53 
The CWA imposes a basic prohibition against “the discharge of any 
pollutant by any person” from any “point source” into “navigable 
waters” without a permit.54  One goal of the CWA’s regulatory 
structure is to prevent pollutants from flowing downstream into 
larger navigable waters.55  Accordingly, the CWA established two main 
permit programs for discharging pollutants into “navigable waters.”56  
First, section 402 of the CWA established the National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), which authorizes the EPA to 
regulate permits allowing the “discharge of any pollutant.”57  Second, 
section 404 requires a permit “for the discharge of dredged or fill 
material into the navigable waters.”58  The Corps oversees the section 
404 permit program, but the EPA and the Corps both implement the 
section.59  For example, the Agencies issue joint regulations 
pertaining to section 404, and the EPA has the ability to override a 
                                                          
 52. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 
159, 179 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (statement of Rep. Mizell) (citing 1 CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT 
AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 369 (1973)). 
 53. Id. (citing 2 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER 
POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1269 (1973)). 
 54. CWA § 301(a); 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).  The “discharge of a pollutant” is defined 
to mean “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.”  
CWA § 502(12); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).  Further, a “pollutant” includes dredged 
material, rock, sand, sewage, or industrial and agricultural waste.  CWA § 502(6); 33 
U.S.C. § 1362(6); see also 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2015) (providing a complete definition of 
“pollutant”).  Further, a “point source” is defined as “any discernable, confined and 
discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, [or] 
tunnel . . . from which pollutants are or may be discharged.”  CWA § 502(14); 33 
U.S.C. § 1362(14). 
 55. See CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 12 (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 77 
(1977)) (observing that “[w]ater moves in hydrologic cycles and it is essential that 
discharge of pollutants be controlled at the source” (alteration in original)). 
 56. Id. at 27. 
 57. CWA § 402; 33 U.S.C. § 1342. 
 58. CWA § 404(a); 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).  “Wetlands are an important subset of 
the ‘waters of the United States’ that section 404 protects,” and section 404 is often 
referenced as the “wetlands program.”  CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 113. 
 59. CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 113, 118 (explaining that the EPA is 
responsible for compliance and enforcement of the CWA and all permit 
requirements). 
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Corps permit decision.60  Some regulated individuals and businesses 
dislike these CWA permit requirements because compliance is time-
consuming and costly.61  Further, failure to comply can result in civil 
and criminal liability, which carries the potential for hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in fines.62 
Ultimately, the CWA delegates authority to the EPA and the Corps 
to regulate “navigable waters,” which Congress defined as “waters of 
the United States, including territorial seas.”63  Although Congress 
did not define what constitutes “waters of the United States,” it 
granted the Agencies the authority to define these “waters” further 
with regulations.64  The key question for establishing whether a body 
of water or a wetland falls within CWA jurisdiction is whether it is a 
“water of the United States” as defined by the Agencies’ regulations.65  
Thus, uncertainty regarding the appropriate definition of “waters of 
the United States” has created confusion “as to when a person does 
or does not need [a section 402] NPDES or [s]ection 404 permit to 
discharge pollutants.”66 
Historically, there has been consensus that the CWA protects 
traditional navigable waters, or waters that were used, are presently 
used, or could be used for commerce, and waters “subject to the ebb 
and flow of the tide.”67  For example, the Corps has found Three Rivers 
in Pittsburgh, PA; Yellowstone River in Billings, MT; and the Mississippi 
River to be traditional navigable waters.68  This interpretation derives 
                                                          
 60. Id. at 118–19. 
 61. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006) (plurality opinion) (“The 
average applicant for an individual permit spends 788 days and $271,596 in 
completing the process, and the average applicant for a nationwide permit spends 
313 days and $28,915—not counting costs of mitigation or design changes. . . . 
‘[O]ver $1.7 billion is spent each year by the private and public sectors obtaining 
wetlands permits.’” (quoting David Sunding & David Zilberman, The Economics of 
Environmental Regulation by Licensing:  An Assessment of Recent Changes to the Wetland 
Permitting Process, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 59, 81 (2002))). 
 62. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (codifying enforcement provisions for the CWA). 
 63. CWA § 502(7); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). 
 64. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2015) (defining “waters of the United States” for the 
Corps); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s) (defining “waters of the United States” for the EPA). 
 65. See CWA § 502(7); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (regulating discharge into “navigable 
waters” defined as “waters of the United States”). 
 66. Allyson C. Chwee, Note, United States v. Cundiff:  Sixth Circuit Decision Makes 
Rapanos v. United States Controversy (Navigable) Water Under a Bridge, 43 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 233, 242 (2009). 
 67. GARDNER, supra note 16, at 38. 
 68. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATION FORM 
INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDEBOOK 17–18, 20 (2007) [hereinafter CORPS’ GUIDEBOOK], 
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from the Corps’ authority to regulate navigable waters under the Rivers 
and Harbors Appropriation Act (“RHA”), dating back to the 1890s.69  
However, the CWA’s legislative history demonstrates that Congress 
did not intend for the interpretation of “waters of the United States” 
to be strictly limited to navigable-in-fact waters.70  The Committee on 
Public Works House Report explained that 
[o]ne term that the Committee was reluctant to define was the 
term “navigable waters.”  The reluctance was based on the fear that 
any interpretation would be read narrowly.  However, this is not the 
Committee’s intent.  The Committee fully intends that the term 
“navigable waters” be given the broadest possible constitutional 
interpretation, unencumbered by agency determinations which 
have been made or may be made for administrative purposes.71 
A Senate-House Conference Committee Report, the FWPCA 
Conference Report, and the floor debate of both the House and 
Senate also support this broad interpretation of the CWA.72  This 
legislative history “links the statutory jurisdiction of the CWA to the 
constitutional authority of the federal government to regulate waters 
and water pollution, leaving both matters to be addressed in the 
future by the federal courts.”73 
B. Development of Agency Regulations and the Court’s Interpretation of 
CWA Jurisdiction 
Federal courts have considered the regulatory definition of “waters 
of the United States” on several occasions.  After Congress granted 
the Corps the authority to implement and enforce the CWA in 1972, 
the Corps issued regulations that defined “navigable waters” using the 
definition for “traditional navigable waters” in the RHA.74  In 1975, 
                                                          
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/regulatory/cwa_guide/jd_gu
idebook_051207final.pdf. 
 69. Id. at 50.  See generally Digest of Federal Resource Laws of Interest to the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service, FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/laws/lawsdigest/riv1899.h 
tml (last visited Oct. 19, 2016) (discussing the RHA’s history). 
 70. CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 12 & nn.9–11. 
 71. H.R. REP. No. 92-911, at 131 (1972). 
 72. CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 12 & n.10 (citing S. REP. NO. 92-1236, at 
144 (1971) and H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 131); Keith, supra note 45, at 574 (citing 
H.R. REP. NO. 92-1465, at 144 (1972) (Conf. Rep.)). 
 73. CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 12. 
 74. GARDNER, supra note 16, at 38 (explaining that the RHA defined “navigable 
waters” to be “only those waters that were navigable in the traditional sense:  
navigable in fact (used in commerce), navigable in the future with reasonable 
improvements, navigable in the past, and subject to the ebb and flow of the tide”). 
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the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia invalidated the 
Corps’ regulation due to its unduly narrow interpretation of the term 
and held that jurisdiction under the CWA should encompass more 
than traditional navigable waters.75  Specifically, the Court held that 
the Corps should interpret jurisdiction to “the maximum extent 
permissible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.”76  
Consequently, courts began applying jurisdiction more broadly after 
this case, finding that CWA jurisdiction extended to more than just 
traditional navigable waters and using legislative intent and history to 
ascertain the permissible scope of jurisdiction under the CWA.77 
In 1977, the Corps promulgated a regulation that defined “waters 
of the United States” to include not only navigable waters but also 
wetlands adjacent to traditional navigable waters and their 
tributaries—waters that flow directly or indirectly into traditional 
navigable waters—as well as “other waters” that “could affect 
interstate commerce.”78  Although environmentalists were content 
with this regulatory definition, property owners challenged the 
Corps’ jurisdiction over “adjacent wetlands” in a case that eventually 
made its way to the Supreme Court.79 
That 1985 case, United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., was the 
first in which the Supreme Court reviewed the scope of the Agencies’ 
regulations under the CWA.  It concerned wetlands adjacent but not 
connected to Lake St. Clair in Macomb County, Michigan,80 and the 
Court considered whether the term “navigable waters” permitted 
CWA jurisdiction over such “adjacent wetlands.”81  A unanimous 
Court deferred to the Corps’ determination that adjacent wetlands 
that border or “are in reasonable proximity to other waters of the 
United States” are “inseparably bound up” with these “waters.”82  
                                                          
 75. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975). 
 76. Id. 
 77. CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 14 (indicating that one CWA law casebook 
even stated in 1998 that “by now, little serious dispute remains over the necessity for 
either a § 402 or 404 permit for discharges into any water”). 
 78. Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,144 
(July 19, 1977) (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323) (defining “waters of the United States”).  
The Corps first promulgated interim final regulations in 1974 and later refined the 
definition of “wetlands” in 1977.  Keith, supra note 45, at 575. 
 79. GARDNER, supra note 16, at 39. 
 80. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 124 (1985). 
 81. Id. at 126. 
 82. Id. at 134 (first quoting 42 Fed. Reg. 37,128 (1977)).  Further, the Court 
refused to distinguish CWA jurisdiction between “wetlands” and “waters.”  See id. at 
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Further, the Court affirmed that the CWA’s definition of “‘navigable 
waters’ as ‘waters of the United States’ makes it clear that the term 
‘navigable’ . . . is of limited import,” and that Congress intended the 
CWA to regulate at least some waters that would not be considered 
traditionally navigable.83 
Thus, the Court upheld the Corps’ regulation and held that the 
Corps had not exceeded its authority by including wetlands adjacent 
to navigable waters in its definition of “waters of the United States.”  
Consequently, the Court determined that wetlands adjacent to 
navigable waters were “navigable waters” within the Agencies’ 
jurisdiction under the CWA.84  However, the Court declined to 
address whether federal regulatory jurisdiction extends to “wetlands 
that are not adjacent to bodies of open water.”85 
Following the Court’s unanimous opinion in Riverside Bayview, the 
Corps revised and reorganized its regulations in 1986.86  The Corps 
did not change the definition of “waters of the United States”; 
however, the Corps added preamble language to clarify jurisdiction 
over “isolated waters,” which became known as the Migratory Bird 
Rule.87  The Migratory Bird Rule gave the Corps the authority to 
regulate activities in isolated waters, such as wetlands, that “are or 
would be used as habitat by . . . migratory birds which cross state 
lines.”88  The Agencies used this preamble language to gain 
                                                          
133 (declaring that “it is reasonable for the Corps to interpret the term ‘waters’ to 
encompass wetlands adjacent to waters as more conventionally defined”). 
 83. Id. at 132–33. 
 84. Id. at 133–34, 139 (concluding that it was “reasonable for the Corps to 
interpret the term ‘waters’ to encompass [adjacent] wetlands”). 
 85. Id. at 131 n.8. 
 86. GARDNER, supra note 16, at 44 (explaining that the Corps separated its 
definition of “waters of the United States” into its own part in the regulations). 
 87. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 
41,206, 41,216–17 (Nov. 13, 1986) [hereinafter Migratory Bird Rule]; GARDNER, supra 
note 16, at 44. 
 88. Migratory Bird Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. at 41,217.  In the Rule, the Corps clarified 
that “waters of the United States” includes intrastate waters: 
a. Which are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory 
Bird Treaties; or 
b. Which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds which 
cross state lines; or 
c. Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered species; or 
d. Used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce. 
Id.  This Rule was not a regulation and was issued by the Corps without following the 
notice-and-comment procedures in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 
(2012).  Thus, courts regarded it as an interpretive rule, and therefore did not afford 
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jurisdiction over “isolated waters,” upsetting many landowners who 
questioned the extent of the Agencies’ jurisdiction under the CWA. 
In 2001, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of CWA 
jurisdiction over isolated waters.  In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook 
County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (“SWANCC”), a waste 
management company challenged federal authority over an 
abandoned sand and gravel pit in northern Illinois that provided a 
habitat for migratory birds.89  Initially, the Corps concluded that it 
did not have jurisdiction over the site due to the lack of “wetlands” 
that the Court found to be jurisdictional under the CWA in Riverside 
Bayview.90  However, the Corps later claimed jurisdiction, stating that 
the site contained “waters of the United States” solely because it 
provided a habitat for migratory birds.91 
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Migratory Bird 
Rule exceeded the scope of authority granted to the Corps under 
section 404(a) of the CWA.92  The Court determined that the Corps 
could not extend the definition of “navigable waters” to “isolated” 
non-navigable intrastate ponds used by migratory birds.93  The Court 
based its ruling on the statutory construction of the CWA without 
reaching the question of whether the Corps had the constitutional 
authority to regulate isolated waters.94 
The Court clarified that the difference between SWANCC and 
Riverside Bayview was the “significant nexus” between the “navigable 
waters” and the waters in question.95  In Riverside Bayview, the 
wetlands “actually abutted on a navigable waterway,” whereas in 
                                                          
it as much deference as they would have an agency regulation.  GARDNER, supra note 
16, at 46–47. 
 89. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 
159, 162, 164 (2001) (“The Corps found that approximately 121 bird species had 
been observed at the site, including several known to depend upon aquatic 
environments for a significant portion of their life requirements.”). 
 90. Id. at 164 (noting the lack of wetlands or support for vegetation typically 
found near water). 
 91. Id.  The Corps used the following criteria for its determination:  “(1) the 
proposed site had been abandoned as a gravel mining operation; (2) the water areas 
and spoil piles had developed a natural character; and (3) the water areas are used as 
habitat by migratory bird [sic] which cross state lines.”  Id. at 164–65. 
 92. Id. at 174. 
 93. Id. at 171. 
 94. Id. at 173–74.  The Court reviewed the statutory construction of “navigable” 
and viewed Congress’s intention for jurisdiction to be grounded in “its commerce 
power over navigation.”  Id. at 168 n.3. 
 95. See id. at 167 (emphasizing the presence of a “‘significant nexus’ between the 
wetlands and ‘navigable waters’” in Riverside Bayview). 
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SWANCC the waters were not directly connected.96  While the Court 
affirmed that the word “navigable” was of “limited import,” it 
declared that it is not the case that the word “navigable” has “no 
effect whatever.”97  Ultimately, the Court found no legislative history 
indicating that Congress contemplated CWA jurisdiction over 
isolated waters and rejected the Corps’ attempt to use the Migratory 
Bird Rule to regulate isolated, non-navigable, intrastate waters that 
had no connection to a navigable waterway.98 
Following SWANCC, the Agencies temporarily considered revising 
their regulations.99  Although the Court struck down the preamble 
language (the Migratory Bird Rule), its decision did not affect the 
Agencies’ definition of “waters of the United States” in the 1986 
regulations.100  However, in December 2003, the Agencies issued 
notice that there would be no new rulemaking.101  After SWANCC, 
several litigants challenged the Agencies’ jurisdiction over “waters” 
that were neither isolated nor directly adjacent to traditional navigable 
waters.102  Subsequently, lower courts struggled to determine whether 
the CWA granted the Agencies jurisdiction over wetlands that were 
adjacent to non-navigable tributaries103 of navigable waters, such as 
those depicted below in Figure 1.104 
                                                          
 96. See generally id. at 167–68 (explaining that for the Corps to prevail, the Court 
“would have to hold that the jurisdiction of the Corps extends to ponds that are not 
adjacent to open water”). 
 97. Id. at 172 (asserting that the word “navigable” shows “what Congress had in 
mind as its authority for enacting the CWA”). 
 98. Id. at 170–71. 
 99. Margaret “Peggy” Strand & Lowell M. Rothschild, What Wetlands Are 
Regulated?  Jurisdiction of the §404 Program, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,372, 10,377 (2010). 
 100. CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 19. 
 101. Strand & Rothschild, supra note 99, at 10,377.  In lieu of rulemaking, the 
Agencies issued a joint guidance legal memorandum that explained the Agencies’ 
position of CWA jurisdiction following SWANCC.  Id. 
 102. CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 15. 
 103. “A non-navigable tributary of a traditional navigable water is a non-navigable 
water body whose waters flow into a traditional navigable water either directly or 
indirectly by means of other tributaries.”  EPA & U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, CLEAN 
WATER ACT JURISDICTION FOLLOWING THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN RAPANOS 
V. UNITED STATES & CARABELL V. UNITED STATES 6 (2008) [hereinafter RAPANOS 
GUIDANCE], https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-02/documents/cwa_j 
urisdiction_following_rapanos120208.pdf. 
 104. See Jonathan H. Adler, Reckoning with Rapanos:  Revisiting “Waters of the United 
States” and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 14 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 7–8 
(2006) (discussing the inconsistency of the CWA’s application following SWANCC in 
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determined that the landowner’s wetlands were jurisdictional under 
the CWA—and thus could not be filled without a permit—because 
“there were hydrological connections between [the wetlands] and 
corresponding adjacent tributaries of navigable waters.”112 
The Supreme Court failed to reach a consensus, issuing a plurality 
opinion with a 4-1-4 split among the Justices.113  Five Justices voted to 
vacate the Sixth Circuit decision, and the Court remanded both 
cases, holding that the Corps failed to apply the correct standard to 
establish jurisdiction over these wetlands as “waters of the United 
States” under the CWA.114  Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, 
determined that “waters of the United States” under the CWA 
includes only “relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of 
water.”115  The plurality explained that “waters of the United States” 
refers more to flowing “bodies forming geographic features such as 
oceans, rivers, [and] lakes.”116 
The plurality acknowledged that the CWA allows jurisdiction in 
certain circumstances over “navigable waters . . . other than those 
waters” which are or could be used “as a means to transport interstate 
or foreign commerce,” such as “adjacent wetlands.”117  Ultimately, 
Justice Scalia explained that “adjacent” wetlands include “only those 
wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that are ‘waters 
of the United States’” such that there is no clear separation between 
“where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.”118  According to 
the plurality, if the wetland is not “relatively permanent” and has no 
“continuous surface connection” with a traditional navigable water, 
the wetland is not jurisdictional under the CWA.119 
                                                          
 112. Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 643. 
 113. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 718 (showing that four Justices joined in the plurality 
opinion, one Justice concurred in the judgment, and four Justices dissented). 
 114. Id. at 757. 
 115. Id. at 732 (emphasis added).  Further, Justice Scalia specified that CWA 
jurisdiction does not include “channels through which water flows intermittently or 
ephemerally, or channels that periodically provide drainage for rainfall.”  Id. at 739. 
 116. Id. at 732 (alteration in original) (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 2882 (2d ed. 1954)). 
 117. Id. at 731, 742 (alteration in original) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)(1)). 
 118. Id. at 742 (second emphasis added).  Thus, the Court reasoned that 
“[w]etlands with only an intermittent, physically remote hydrologic connection to 
‘waters of the United States’ do not implicate the boundary-drawing problem of 
Riverside Bayview, and . . . lack the necessary connection to covered waters that [the 
Court] described as a ‘significant nexus’ in SWANCC.”  Id. (citing Solid Waste Agency 
of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001)). 
 119. Id. at 742. 
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Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, agreed that the cases 
should be remanded but disagreed that a “continuous surface 
connection” was the appropriate standard for determining whether 
wetlands constitute “waters of the United States.”120  Justice Kennedy 
concluded that the Corps’ jurisdiction over wetlands “depends on the 
existence of a significant nexus between the wetlands in question and 
navigable waters in the traditional sense.”121  He stated that “wetlands 
possess the requisite nexus, and thus come within the statutory 
phrase ‘navigable waters,’ if the wetlands, either alone or in 
combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly 
affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered 
waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’”122  Further, if the 
wetlands were found to be “speculative” or “insubstantial,” then they 
would not be found jurisdictional under the CWA.123  While the 
Corps could presume jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to truly 
navigable waters,124 Justice Kennedy specified that adjacency to a non-
navigable tributary will not establish jurisdiction without a greater 
ecological connection.125 
Further, Justice Kennedy explained that the Corps could choose to 
identify “categories of tributaries that[,] due to their volume of flow 
(either annually or on average), their proximity to navigable waters, or 
other relevant considerations,” have a “significant nexus” with 
navigable waters.126  However, in the absence of regulations, Justice 
Kennedy directed the Corps to proceed on a case-by-case basis to 
determine whether it had authority to regulate wetlands based on their 
adjacency to non-navigable tributaries.  He also suggested that, in the 
interest of administrative efficiency or necessity, the Corps might 
have presumptive jurisdiction over similar wetlands in the region.127 
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, criticized both Justice 
Kennedy and the plurality for “[r]ejecting more than [thirty] years of 
practice by the Army Corps.”128  He concluded that on remand “each 
                                                          
 120. Id. at 779 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 121. Id. (emphasis added). 
 122. Id. at 780. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985) 
(holding that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters were considered jurisdictional 
under the CWA). 
 125. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 786 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 126. Id. at 781. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens explained that the Corps’ 
“decision to treat these wetlands as encompassed within the term ‘waters of the 
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of the judgments should be reinstated if either [Justice Kennedy’s or 
the plurality’s test] is met.”129  Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer 
each wrote separately and urged the Corps to promulgate rules to 
redefine “waters of the United States.”130 
Despite the Court’s lack of consensus, Rapanos is the closest 
guidance for properly interpreting the scope of CWA jurisdiction.131  
However, because Rapanos did not garner a majority opinion, two 
competing tests for establishing CWA jurisdiction have emerged from 
the Court’s decisions.132  The first test, established in Justice Scalia’s 
plurality opinion, provides for CWA jurisdiction for “relatively 
permanent” waters with a “continuous surface connection” between 
the wetland and other “waters of the United States.”133  The second 
test, articulated in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, provides for 
jurisdiction if a “significant nexus” exists between a wetland and 
other “waters of the United States.”134  To date, courts at both the 
district and appellate levels have wrestled with which test to apply.135 
C. Deciphering the Correct Standard to Apply Post-Rapanos 
Since Rapanos, the U.S. Courts of Appeals have failed to agree 
about whether the plurality’s opinion or Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
provides the controlling standard.136  The circuit courts have found 
                                                          
United States’ is a quintessential example of the Executive’s reasonable 
interpretation of a statutory provision.”  Id. (citing Chevron USA Inc. v. Nat. Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984)). 
 129. Id. at 810. 
 130. Id. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (referencing the Agencies’ failure to 
promulgate guidelines following SWANCC, which would have received “deference 
under [the Court’s] generous standards”); id. at 812 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 131. See infra Sections I.C–D (discussing the courts’ and Agencies’ interpretations 
of CWA jurisdiction following Rapanos). 
 132. Kristen Clark, Comment, Navigating Through the Confusion Left in the Wake of 
Rapanos:  Why a Rule Clarifying and Broadening Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act Is 
Necessary, 39 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 295, 296–97 (2014). 
 133. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742 (plurality opinion). 
 134. Id. at 779–80 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 135. One district court judge even stated, “I am so perplexed by the way the law 
applicable to this case has developed that it would be inappropriate for me to try it 
again.”  United States v. Robison, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1248 (N.D. Ala. 2007); see 
also United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613 (N.D. Tex. 
2006) (reviewing a case on existing precedent in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit and essentially ignoring Rapanos because the case “leaves no guidance 
on how to implement its vague, subjective centerpiece”). 
 136. See Memorandum from Dick Pedersen, President, Envtl. Council of the 
States, to Whom It May Concern 7, 8 (Sept. 11, 2014) [hereinafter ECOS Memo], 
http://acoel.org/file.axd?file=2014%2f9%2fWaters+of+the+U+S+Final+9_11_14.pdf 
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CWA jurisdiction for wetlands that meet only Justice Kennedy’s standard 
or wetlands that meet either standard.137  However, no federal court of 
appeals has held that the plurality’s standard alone is controlling.138  The 
Supreme Court has denied each petition for review requesting the 
Court to clarify the scope of CWA jurisdiction following Rapanos.139 
1. Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits:  Justice Kennedy’s test controls 
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuits have all held that Justice Kennedy’s opinion provides the 
controlling standard from Rapanos.140  Each of these courts reasoned 
that the “significant nexus” standard was the “narrowest ground”—
the least restrictive ground—upon which Rapanos could be 
interpreted.141  The circuit courts determined that Justice Kennedy’s 
test would “classify a water as ‘navigable’ more frequently than the 
plurality’s test.”142  The Seventh and Ninth Circuits explained that it 
would be rare for a wetland to meet the plurality’s test and not meet 
Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test.143  In most cases in which the 
plurality would find jurisdiction due to a “surface-water connection,” 
Justice Kennedy would also find a “significant nexus.”144  However, the 
circuit courts acknowledged the potential for a rare case in which the 
plurality would find jurisdiction over a surface-water connection so 
“remote” that a “significant nexus” would not be found under Justice 
                                                          
(discussing how lower courts have struggled to interpret the Supreme Court’s 
plurality decision in Rapanos). 
 137. Id. at 8–13.  Additionally, the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and District 
of Columbia Circuits have refrained from making a decision as to which standard 
controls.  Id. at 13. 
 138. Chwee, supra note 66, at 264. 
 139. CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 21. 
 140. N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 
2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1180 (2008); United States v. Robinson, 505 F.3d 1208,1222 
(11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied sub nom. United States v. McWane, Inc., 555 U.S. 1045 
(2008); United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724–25 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(per curiam), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 810 (2007). 
 141. N. Cal. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 999; Robinson, 505 F.3d at 1222; Gerke 
Excavating, 464 F.3d at 724–25.  The circuits used Marks v. United States to interpret 
the holding of the plurality opinion in Rapanos.  430 U.S. 188 (1977).  The Supreme 
Court held in Marks that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single 
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the 
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .’”  Id. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)). 
 142. Robinson, 505 F.3d at 1221. 
 143. Id. at 1223; Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d at 724–25. 
 144. Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d at 724–25. 
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Kennedy’s test.145  Regardless of this rare possibility, the courts agreed 
that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence provided the “least common 
denominator” between all of the fragmented opinions in Rapanos and 
is the controlling standard for establishing CWA jurisdiction.146 
2. First, Third, and Eighth Circuits:  Either the plurality’s or Justice 
 Kennedy’s tests may be used 
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, and Eighth Circuits 
have reasoned that neither test controls, and that courts may use 
either the plurality’s standard or Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” 
test to determine whether wetlands fall under the jurisdiction of the 
CWA as “waters of the United States.”147  The First Circuit disagreed 
with the reasoning of the Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.148  
The First Circuit emphasized the scenario in which the plurality’s test 
would find jurisdiction based on a remote surface connection but 
Justice Kennedy’s test would not.149  Thus, the court concluded that if 
Justice Kennedy’s test controlled, “there would be a bizarre 
outcome . . . [in which] the court would find no federal jurisdiction 
even though eight Justices . . . would all agree that federal authority 
should extend to such a situation.”150 
For this reason, the First Circuit decided that it was more logical to 
follow Justice Stevens’s approach in the Rapanos dissent, which would 
hold that the “United States may elect to prove jurisdiction under 
                                                          
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 725; see also N. Cal. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 999–1000 (explaining that 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence “[is] the narrowest ground to which a majority of the 
Justices would assent if forced to choose in almost all cases”); Robinson, 505 F.3d at 
1221–22 (finding that the “significant nexus” test in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is 
the controlling test). 
 147. United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
2409 (2012); United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Johnson, 467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 948 (2007). 
 148. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 61–64.  The First Circuit concluded that the standard 
from Marks did not translate to Rapanos.  Id. at 64.  The court reasoned there are 
several other plausible interpretations of “narrowest ground” and concluded that an 
opinion is “narrower” “only when one opinion is a logical subset of other, broader 
opinions.”  Id. at 63.  Ultimately, the First, Third, and Eighth Circuits concluded that 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence was not a logical subset of the plurality’s opinion 
because there is a case when the plurality would find jurisdiction and Justice Kennedy 
may not.  Donovan, 661 F.3d at 181; Bailey, 571 F.3d at 799; Johnson, 467 F.3d at 64. 
 149. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 64. 
 150. Id.  In this hypothetical situation, the court notes that the Rapanos plurality 
and dissenters could agree about jurisdiction to form the eight Justice majority.  Id. 
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either test.”151  Under Justice Stevens’s approach, the court explained, 
jurisdiction exists “where a majority of the Court would support such 
a finding.”152  Subsequently, the Third and Eighth Circuits followed 
suit, holding that “federal regulatory jurisdiction can be established 
over wetlands that meet either the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s test 
from Rapanos.”153 
D. Post-Rapanos Regulation and the Agencies’ Development of the Clean 
Water Rule 
After Rapanos, the Agencies issued joint guidance documents that 
interpreted the scope of the “waters of the United States” in light of 
the Court’s opinion.154  The Agencies asserted that “water” would fall 
under the jurisdiction of the CWA if it met either the plurality’s 
standard or Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test.155  The 
guidance documents identified categories of waters that remained 
jurisdictional, categories that were not jurisdictional, and categories 
that would require case-specific analysis as required by Justice 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Rapanos.156  The Agencies used 
case-specific analysis to review waters that did not meet the plurality’s 
standard of a continuous surface connection and did not fit evenly 
into any other category of jurisdiction.  Thus, these “waters” needed 
closer examination to determine if a “significant nexus” was present 
for CWA jurisdiction.157 
Ultimately, many CWA permit applications fell into this category 
and required lengthy and burdensome case-specific review to 
determine whether a “significant nexus” was present with a “water of 
the United States.”158  Despite the Agencies’ attempt to clarify the 
                                                          
 151. Id. (citing Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 810 n.14 (2006) (Stevens, 
J., dissent)) (“I assume that Justice Kennedy’s approach will be controlling in most 
cases because it treats more of the Nation’s waters as within the Corps’ jurisdiction, 
but in the unlikely event that the plurality’s test is met but Justice Kennedy’s is not, 
courts should also uphold the Corps’ jurisdiction.”). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Donovan, 661 F.3d at 182 (emphasis added); Bailey, 571 F.3d at 799. 
 154. Strand & Rothschild, supra note 99, at 10,377 (detailing that the Agencies 
first issued joint guidance in June 2007; however, they later reissued this guidance in 
December 2008). 
 155. CWA HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 19–20. 
 156. Strand & Rothschild, supra note 99, at 10,378. 
 157. RAPANOS GUIDANCE, supra note 103, at 12. 
 158. COPELAND, R43943, supra note 3, at 1; see also Clark, supra note 132, at 297 
(describing the administrative burden and taxing nature of conducting case-specific 
analysis to establish CWA jurisdiction). 
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scope of CWA jurisdiction with guidance documents, the regulated 
public was still confused about which “waters” constituted “waters of 
the United States” and when a permit was required to discharge 
pollutants into these “waters.”159  In 2011, the Agencies attempted to 
issue another guidance document to make the “case-by-case analysis 
of ‘significant nexus’ waters more clear”; however, they never 
published the final guidance.160 
As a result of this confusion, businesses, environmental groups, 
landowners, and even the Supreme Court urged the Agencies to 
promulgate rules that would increase uniformity and consistency in the 
CWA permit process.161  Finally, in 2014, the Agencies responded to 
these pleas and jointly issued a proposed rule to clarify the definition of 
“waters of the United States.”162  After receiving over one million public 
comments, the Agencies published the final rule in June 2015, titled 
“Clean Water Rule:  Definition of ‘Waters of the United States.’”163 
In August 2015, the Rule went into effect replacing the Agencies’ 
existing guidance documents.164  The goal of the Rule is to “clarify 
the scope of ‘waters of the United States’ that are protected under 
the” CWA and make the process of identifying these “waters” easier to 
                                                          
 159. See Clark, supra note 132, at 297 (discussing the Agencies’ inability to provide 
sufficient clarification with guidance documents following Rapanos). 
 160. Id. at 308–09. 
 161. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 758 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring) (criticizing the proposed rulemaking following SWANCC, which “went 
nowhere”); id. at 812 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (urging the Agencies to “write new 
regulations, and speedily so”); EPA Requests, supra note 27 (listing requests for 
rulemaking from business associations, environmental groups, and landowners); see 
also Stephen M. Johnson, The Rulemaking Response to Rapanos:  The Government’s Best 
Hope for Retaining Broad Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
CLEAN WATER ACT:  FIVE ESSAYS 22, 33 (L. Kinvin Wroth ed., 2007) (explaining that 
agency rulemaking allows for increased reliability when interpreting statutes and 
increased public participation due to the notice and comment requirements under 
the Administrative Procedure Act).  However, agencies often prefer to issue guidance 
documents over rulemaking because there are fewer procedural requirements, and 
agencies can adopt or change policy more quickly with guidance than with 
rulemaking.  Id. at 31–32. 
 162. Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 
Fed. Reg. 22,188 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014). 
 163. 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and 
scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.). 
 164. See supra note 30 (explaining that the North Dakota District Court’s Order 
enjoined implementation of the Rule in thirteen states).  The Sixth Circuit has also 
stayed enforcement of the Rule nationwide pending its decision on the merits.  See 
supra note 34 (mentioning the stay on the Rule’s implementation issued in October 
2015). 
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understand and more predictable.165  The Agencies rely on a 
comprehensive scientific report titled Connectivity of Streams & 
Wetlands to Downstream Waters:  A Review & Synthesis of the Scientific 
Evidence (“Science Report”) to provide a scientific basis for 
determining connections between certain categories of water in the 
Rule.166  The Science Report is “based on a review of more than 1,200 
peer-reviewed publications” and concludes that “waters fall along a 
gradient of chemical, physical, and biological connection to 
traditional navigable waters, and it is the [A]gencies’ task to 
determine where along that gradient to draw lines of jurisdiction 
under the CWA.”167  Using the Science Report, legal analysis, and 
practical experience, the Agencies categorized jurisdictional waters as 
waters that possess a “significant nexus” with “traditional navigable 
waters, interstate waters, or the territorial seas.”168 
The Rule maintains the general structure of the Agencies’ definition 
in existing regulations and follows the same categorical breakdown of 
waters in the Agencies’ guidance documents.169  Similarly, the Rule 
includes three categories of jurisdiction:  (1) “[w]aters that are 
jurisdictional in all instances,” (2) “waters that are excluded from 
jurisdiction,” and (3) “a narrow category of waters subject to case-specific 
analysis to determine whether they are jurisdictional.”170  The Rule 
defines “waters of the United States” as follows: 
                                                          
 165. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,055; see also COPELAND, R43943, supra 
note 3, at 1 (explaining that the Final Rule was meant to condense and streamline 
jurisdictional determinations and to minimize case-specific review). 
 166. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,057 (citing U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
EPA/600/R-14/475F, CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS & WETLANDS TO DOWNSTREAM 
WATERS:  A REVIEW & SYNTHESIS OF THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2015) [hereinafter 
SCIENCE REPORT], http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/risk/recordisplay.cfm?deid=296414&C 
FID=41777546&CFTOKEN=20401943).  The Agencies also issued a Technical 
Support Document, which is a 423-page document that addresses the legal basis and 
existing scientific literature supporting the “significant nexus” determinations in the 
Rule.  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & DEP’T OF THE ARMY, TECHNICAL SUPPORT 
DOCUMENT FOR THE CLEAN WATER RULE:  DEFINITION OF WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES 
(2015) [hereinafter TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT], http://www.epa.gov/sites/pro 
duction/files/2015-05/documents/technical_support_document_for_the_clean_wat 
er_rule_1.pdf.  This Comment takes the Science Report at face value and analyzes 
the Rule with the presumption that the Report is valid. 
 167. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,057. 
 168. Id.  The Rule also notes that “[i]f evolving science and the [A]gencies’ 
experience lead to a need for action to alter the jurisdictional categories, any such 
action will be conducted as part of a rule-making process.”  Id. at 37,058. 
 169. COPELAND, R43455, supra note 6, at 2. 
 170. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,057. 
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(1) All waters which are currently used, were used in the past, or may 
be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all 
waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide; 
(2) All interstate waters, including interstate wetlands; 
(3) The territorial seas; 
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise identified as waters of 
the United States under this section; 
(5) All tributaries . . . of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(1) 
through (3) of this section; 
(6) All waters adjacent to a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) 
through (5) of this section, including wetlands, ponds, lakes, 
oxbows, impoundments, and similar waters.171 
The Rule also includes two categories of waters in sections (a)(7) 
and (a)(8) that the Agencies must consider on a case-by-case basis to 
determine whether a “significant nexus” connection exists.172  These 
new sections allow the Agencies to determine whether a “significant 
nexus” connection is present with these waters alone, or in 
combination with other similarly situated waters.173  Section (a)(7) of 
the Rule lists five specific types of “waters” that the Science Report 
has found “function alike and are sufficiently close to function 
together in affecting downstream waters.”174  Accordingly, the Rule 
requires the Agencies to consider these “waters” together when 
                                                          
 171. Id. at 37,104 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1)–(6)).  This section of 33 
C.F.R. Part 328 and all further citations in this Comment to 33 C.F.R. Part 328 also 
appear in 40 C.F.R. Parts 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, and 401 as 
outlined in the Final Rule.  Id. at 37, 106–27. 
 172. Id. at 37,104–05 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7)–(8)). 
 173. Id. at 37,058–59. 
 174. TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 331.  Clean Water Rule, 80 
Fed. Reg. at 37,104–05 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7)) (emphasis added) includes 
[a]ll waters in paragraphs (a)(7)(i) through (v) of this section [defined as 
Prairie potholes, Carolina bays and Delmarva bays, Pocosins, Western vernal pools, 
and Texas coastal prairie wetlands] where they are determined, on a case-
specific basis, to have a significant nexus to a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) 
through (3) of this section.  The waters identified in each of paragraphs 
(a)(7)(i) through (v) of this section are similarly situated and shall be combined, 
for purposes of a significant nexus analysis, in the watershed that drains to 
the nearest water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section.  
Waters identified in this paragraph shall not be combined with waters 
identified in paragraph (a)(6) of this section when performing a significant 
nexus analysis.  If waters identified in this paragraph are also an adjacent 
water under paragraph (a)(6), they are an adjacent water and no case-
specific significant nexus analysis is required. 
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determining whether a “significant nexus” exists with another “water 
of the United States” listed in sections (a)(1)–(3).175 
Further, section (a)(8) identifies additional waters that the 
Agencies will also consider on a case-by-case basis.176  Unlike section 
(a)(7), section (a)(8) requires Agency officials to determine whether 
the “waters” should be combined for the “significant nexus” 
analysis.177  These waters include  (1) “waters located within the 100-
year floodplain[178] of a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) 
through (3),” and (2) “all waters located within 4,000 feet of the high 
tide line or ordinary high water mark of a water identified in 
paragraphs (a)(1) through (5).”179 
Next, the Rule specifies waters that will not be considered “waters of 
the United States.”180  Some of these waters include waste treatment 
systems, prior converted cropland, certain artificial water features—
such as reflecting pools—three types of ditches, erosional features, 
puddles, groundwater, and storm water control features.181 
                                                          
 175. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,058–59. 
 176. Id. at 37,105 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(8)) (“All waters located within 
the 100-year floodplain of a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this 
section and all waters located within 4,000 feet of the high tide line or ordinary high 
water mark of a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (5) of this section 
where they are determined on a case-specific basis to have a significant nexus to a 
water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section.”). 
 177. Id.  Specifically, the Rule provides, 
For waters determined to have a significant nexus, the entire water is a water 
of the United States if a portion is located within the 100-year floodplain of a 
water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section or within 4,000 feet of 
the high tide line or ordinary high water mark.  Waters identified in this 
paragraph shall not be combined with waters identified in paragraph (a)(6) 
of this section when performing a significant nexus analysis.  If waters 
identified in this paragraph are also an adjacent water under paragraph 
(a)(6), they are an adjacent water and no case-specific significant nexus 
analysis is required. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 178. “The ‘100-year floodplain’ is the area with a one percent annual chance of 
flooding.”  TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 124. 
 179. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,105.  The Rule defines “high tide line” 
as the “line of intersection of the land with the water’s surface at the maximum 
height reached by a rising tide.”  Id. at 37,106 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(7)). 
 180. Id. at 37, 105 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)). 
 181. Id.  For the complete list of excluded “waters,” see id. 
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The Rule also defines several terms for the first time, including 
“tributary,” “neighboring,” and “significant nexus.”182  Most 
importantly, the Rule defines “significant nexus”: 
Significant nexus.  The term significant nexus means that a water, 
including wetlands, either alone or in combination with other 
similarly situated waters in the region, significantly affects the 
chemical, physical, or biological integrity of a water identified in 
paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section. . . . For an effect to 
be significant, it must be more than speculative or insubstantial.  
Waters are similarly situated when they function alike and are 
sufficiently close to function together in affecting downstream waters.  For 
purposes of determining whether or not a water has a significant 
nexus, the water’s effect on downstream paragraph (a)(1) through 
(3) waters shall be assessed by evaluating the aquatic functions . . . 
of this section.  A water has a significant nexus when any single 
function or combination of functions performed by the water, 
alone or together with similarly situated waters in the region, 
contributes significantly to the chemical, physical, or biological 
integrity of the nearest water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) 
through (3) of this section.183 
The Rule’s preamble explains that “[t]he scope of jurisdiction in 
this [R]ule is narrower than that under the existing regulation.”184  It 
further notes that “[f]ewer waters will be defined as ‘waters of the 
United States’ under the rule than under the existing regulations.”185  
Nevertheless, the Rule has created significant controversy among 
“regulated entities[, which] have criticized the Agencies for 
overreaching and expanding CWA jurisdiction.”186  This Comment 
                                                          
 182. Id. at 37,073.  For full definitions of these terms, see id. at 37,105–06 
(codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(2), (3), (5)). 
 183. Id. at 37,106 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(5)) (emphasis added).  
Further, a significant nexus evaluation involves consideration of the following 
relevant functions: 
 (i) Sediment trapping, (ii) Nutrient recycling, (iii) Pollutant trapping, 
transformation, filtering, and transport, (iv) Retention and attenuation of 
flood waters, (v) Runoff storage, (vi) Contribution of flow, (vii) Export of 
organic matter, (viii) Export of food resources, and (ix) Provision of life 
cycle dependent aquatic habitat (such as foraging, feeding, nesting, 
breeding, spawning, or use as a nursery area) for species located in a water 
identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section. 
Id. 
 184. Id. at 37,054. 
 185. See id. (explaining that the Rule reduces jurisdiction by expanding regulatory 
exclusions and defining certain terms that were previously undefined). 
 186. See Andrea M. Hogan et al., What to Know About the “Waters of the United States” 
Rule, LAW360 (July 6, 2015, 1:03 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/674520/wha 
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addresses one allegation, among many, namely whether the Rule 
“expand[s] CWA jurisdiction beyond historical coverage and U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent.”187 
II. THE CLEAN WATER RULE PROPERLY INTERPRETS CWA 
JURISDICTION AND COMPORTS WITH SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
The Clean Water Rule was a response to hundreds of requests for 
clarification on the scope of “waters of the United States.”  In the 
Rule, the Agencies have used a combination of science, technical 
expertise, and practical experience to establish when a “significant 
nexus” is always present with certain categories of “waters.”  These 
“waters” are considered per se jurisdictional under the CWA.  
Further, the Rule creates two categories of “water” where jurisdiction 
must be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.  This Part analyzes the Rule 
and argues that it is permissible under Supreme Court precedent.  
Moreover, the Rule provides the public with additional clarity on the 
scope of federal jurisdiction by defining terms previously undefined, 
providing bright-line delineations, and creating per se categories that 
will help to streamline agency review. 
A. The Rule Adopts Justice Kennedy’s “Significant Nexus” Test 
The Final Rule adopts and incorporates Justice Kennedy’s 
“significant nexus” test into its definition of “waters of the United 
States.”188  While there is no unanimous agreement that his 
concurrence in Rapanos is controlling, courts have generally accepted 
Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test as the “best instruction on 
the permissible parameters of ‘waters of the United States.’”189  While 
                                                          
t-to-know-about-the-waters-of-the-united-states-rule (listing potential legal challenges 
that the Rule would face following its implementation). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Clean Water Rule:  Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 
37,054, 37,104–08 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts 
of 40 C.F.R.); see, e.g., Christopher D. Thomas, Defining “Waters of the United States”:  A 
Mean-Spirited Guide, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Summer 2015, at 33 (noting that the 
Final Rule and its preamble mention the phrase ‘significant nexus’ 438 times in 
comparison to the phrase “relatively permanent” from the plurality’s standard, which 
is mentioned only twice). 
 189. In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804, 807 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Cundiff, 
555 F.3d 200, 208–10 (6th Cir. 2009)).  In its October 2015 Order staying 
implementation of the Clean Water Rule nationwide, the Sixth Circuit noted that 
“[t]here are real questions regarding the collective meaning of the Court’s 
fragmented opinions in Rapanos.”  Id. at 807 n.3.  However, even the parties 
challenging the Rule have accepted the Agencies’ interpretation of CWA jurisdiction 
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the Agencies used both the plurality’s and Justice Kennedy’s tests to 
establish jurisdiction following Rapanos,190 the Rule incorporates 
Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” standard into the new definition 
of “waters of the United States.”191  The Rule explains that each 
category of jurisdictional water must have a “significant nexus” with 
traditional navigable waters.192  In the Rule, the Agencies define 
“significant nexus” for the first time and redefine the categories of CWA 
jurisdiction using the “significant nexus” test.193  The Agencies used the 
Science Report and their own expertise to identify six categories of 
waters, listed in sections (a)(1)–(6), that are per se jurisdictional because 
there will always be a “significant nexus” between these types of waters 
and traditional navigable water.194  Further, the Rule establishes two 
categories of “waters” in sections (a)(7) and (a)(8) that the Agencies 
must consider on a case-specific basis to determine if a “significant 
nexus” is present to justify CWA jurisdiction.195 
The Rule’s definition of “significant nexus” expounds on Justice 
Kennedy’s framework of what may constitute a “significant nexus” in 
Rapanos.  In Rapanos, Justice Kennedy stated that “[t]he required 
nexus must be assessed in terms of the statute’s goals and purposes,” 
which Congress specified were “to ‘restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.’”196  
Similarly, the Rule’s definition of “significant nexus” specifies that a 
                                                          
using Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test.  Id. at 807.  Further, both the 
Agencies and all of the Circuit Courts of Appeals following Rapanos have 
acknowledged Justice Kennedy’s test as the requisite standard.  See TECHNICAL 
SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 41 (explaining agreement between all of the 
Circuit Courts of Appeal that Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” standard should 
be considered when determining jurisdiction under the CWA).  For more discussion, 
entire scholarly articles have been devoted to the analysis of interpreting a 
controlling opinion from Rapanos.  See generally Chwee, supra note 66 (analyzing how 
courts should apply the plurality’s and Justice Kennedy’s standard in Rapanos). 
 190. See RAPANOS GUIDANCE, supra note 103, at 3 (announcing that the Agencies 
will find CWA jurisdiction if either the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s test is met). 
 191. Id. at 7. 
 192. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,057. 
 193. See id. at 37,068, 37,073 (finding categorical jurisdiction for all tributaries and 
adjacent waters based on scientific findings that these waters have a “significant 
nexus” connection with traditional navigable waters). 
 194. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (citing the sections of the Rule that 
provide for per se CWA jurisdiction). 
 195. See supra notes 172–79 and accompanying text (citing and explaining the 
types of waters that may be considered jurisdictional on a case-by-case basis). 
 196. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 779 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)). 
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“significant nexus means that a water . . . significantly affects the 
chemical, physical, or biological integrity of a water.”197 
Further, in Rapanos, Justice Kennedy identified factors such as 
“volume of flow” and “proximity to navigable waters,” which the 
Agencies may view as “relevant considerations” to determine whether 
adjacent wetlands have a “significant enough” connection to navigable 
waters to be jurisdictional under the CWA.198  Accordingly, the Rule’s 
definition incorporated similar factors to evaluate the presence of a 
“significant nexus.”199  While the Agencies defined “significant nexus” 
officially for the first time, the factors codified in the Rule’s definition 
are the same factors that the Circuit Courts of Appeals have applied 
nationwide following Rapanos to establish a “significant nexus.”200  
Hence, the presence of these factors in the Rule’s definition should 
come as no surprise to CWA permit seekers and lower court judges.  
While Justice Kennedy specified that CWA jurisdiction depended on a 
“significant nexus” connection, he acknowledged that the Agencies 
could further define this standard, which is precisely what the Agencies 
have done.201  Although the Agencies do not specifically articulate 
that they have adopted Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test, they 
have implicitly adopted his test as the requisite standard to establish 
CWA jurisdiction by incorporating the test into each category of 
jurisdictional water in the Rule.202 
                                                          
 197. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,106 (codified at 33 C.F.R. 
§ 328.3(c)(5)). 
 198. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 781 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 199. See Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,106 (codified at 33 C.F.R. 
§ 328.3(c)(5)(vi)) (incorporating other factors, such as sediment trapping, nutrient 
recycling, runoff storage, contribution of flow, and export of organic matter). 
 200. See TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 44–45 (listing the types 
of functions used by federal circuit courts to evaluate a “‘significant nexus’ with a 
downstream traditionally navigable water”).  For example, courts have considered 
“water storage capacity,” Precon Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 603 F. 
App’x 149, 151 (4th Cir. 2015); “contribution of flow,” United States v. Donovan, 661 
F.3d 174, 186 (3d Cir. 2011); “runoff,” United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 210–11 
(6th Cir. 2009); “nutrient recycling,” Donovan, 662 F.3d at 186; “pollutant trapping or 
filtering,” Donovan, 662 F.3d at 186, United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 327 (5th 
Cir. 2008); “export of organic matter,” Donovan, 662 F.3d at 186; and “fish and 
wildlife habitat,” N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 1000–01 
(9th Cir. 2007). 
 201. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 781–82 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (referencing the 
Agencies’ ability to specify with “regulations or adjudication”); see also Thomas, supra 
note 188, at 33–34 (hypothesizing that the Agencies “prepared the administrative 
record with the belief that Justice Kennedy might someday be the fifth vote to 
uphold the rule”). 
 202. Thomas, supra note 188, at 33. 
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The definition of “significant nexus” and the incorporation of the 
“significant nexus” test into the Rule’s categories of CWA jurisdiction 
will help streamline review and make regulation of the CWA more 
consistent.  Prior to the Rule, the Agencies’ guidance documents 
explained that the Agencies could evaluate waters for a “significant 
nexus” connection; however, the documents presented no uniform 
standard for doing so to the regulated public.203  The absence of a 
definition led to inconsistency not only among Agency decisions but 
also in the standard courts used to evaluate challenges to permit 
decisions.204  Thus, to implement the “significant nexus” test 
consistently, the Agencies needed a uniform definition to clarify what 
constituted a “significant nexus.”  By incorporating the “significant 
nexus” standard into categories of waters that the Agencies will 
consider per se jurisdictional,205 the Rule will help streamline Agency 
review by eliminating burdensome and time-consuming case-by-case 
analyses for these waters. 
Despite this benefit, critics of the Rule have argued that the 
Agencies have impermissibly expanded CWA jurisdiction by defining 
“significant nexus” more broadly to include “waters that would 
previously have been out of reach.”206  However, the Agencies have 
adopted the definition based on Justice Kennedy’s opinion in 
Rapanos and have codified the Agency standards used in practice.207  
If anything, the Rule’s definition should provide assurance to permit-
seekers that the Agencies will apply the standard more consistently 
                                                          
 203. See RAPANOS GUIDANCE, supra note 103, at 1, 8 (indicating the factors that will 
be taken into consideration when determining the presence of a “significant nexus” 
without further detail). 
 204. See, e.g., Precon, 603 F. App’x at 151 (declaring that “the significant nexus test 
is a ‘flexible ecological inquiry’”); Cundiff, 555 F.3d at 211 (declaring laboratory 
analysis “is [not] the sole method by which a significant nexus may be proved”); 
United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613 (N.D. Tex. 2006) 
(declaring the ambiguity of “significant nexus” in Rapanos when the court reflected, 
“exactly what is ‘significant’ and how is a ‘nexus’ determined?”). 
 205. See supra text accompanying note 171 (listing sections (a)(1)–(6) of the Rule 
and explaining the types of “waters” that will be considered per se jurisdictional). 
 206. Christopher H. Dolan & Olivia D. Lucas, Unsettled Waters:  Clean Water Rule 
Challenges Remain, LAW360 (Sept. 16, 2015, 12:28 PM), http://www.law360.com/articl 
es/701635/unsettled-waters-clean-water-rule-challenges-remain (alteration in 
original) (explaining that many of the industry and agriculture sectors interpreted 
the Rule as a significant expansion of the waters the Agencies could regulate within 
their CWA jurisdiction). 
 207. RAPANOS GUIDANCE, supra note 103, at 9 (announcing how the Agencies will 
apply the “significant nexus” test to establish CWA jurisdiction following Rapanos). 
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nationwide.208  Therefore, by adopting Justice Kennedy’s framework 
and promulgating a definition for “significant nexus,” the Agencies 
have provided increased clarity to the regulated public and have 
adhered to the permissible scope of CWA jurisdiction articulated by 
Justice Kennedy in Rapanos. 
B. The Rule Incorporates the “Significant Nexus” Test into Three Categories 
of CWA Jurisdiction 
The Rule’s definition of “waters of the United States” includes 
three broad categories of jurisdiction for waters protected under the 
CWA.209  These categories include (1) “[w]aters that are jurisdictional 
in all instances,” (2) “waters that are excluded from jurisdiction,” and 
(3) “a narrow category of waters subject to case-specific analysis to 
determine whether they are jurisdictional.”210  While the Rule retains 
this general categorical structure from the Agencies’ guidance 
documents, the Rule primarily affects a few portions of the definition 
in existing regulations.211  “Tributaries” and “adjacent waters” are now 
considered per se jurisdictional based on new definitions for these 
waters,212 and the category formerly called “other waters” is now two 
categories of “waters” that the Agencies must review on a case-by-case 
basis.213  Despite public concern over these changes, the Rule 
comports with Supreme Court precedent. 
1. Waters that are per se jurisdictional 
The Rule identifies “waters” that will always be considered 
jurisdictional under the CWA.  The per se jurisdictional “waters” are 
further divided into six subcategories:  (1) traditional navigable 
                                                          
 208. Clean Water Rule:  Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 
37,054, 37,095 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts of 40 
C.F.R.) (explaining how the Rule provides “clear and consistent parameters” for 
Agency officials and “transparency to the regulated public over which factors will be 
considered”). 
 209. Id. at 37,057. 
 210. Id.  The Rule explains that the Agencies will alter these categories, if needed, 
to reflect any changes in the evolving science around water classifications or the 
Agencies’ own experience implementing the Rule.  Id. at 37,058. 
 211. See Thomas, supra note 188, at 34 (analyzing that the “Final Rule most notably 
tinkers with the language in three areas of major concern”). 
 212. The Rule did not change the primary definition of “adjacent”; however, it 
defined the term “neighboring,” which is included in the definition of “adjacent 
waters,” for the first time.  Hogan et al., supra note 186. 
 213. Id. 
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waters, (2) interstate waters, (3) territorial seas, (4) impoundments of 
jurisdictional waters, (5) tributaries, and (6) adjacent waters.214 
The first four subcategories of per se “waters” have been 
traditionally classified as jurisdictional under the CWA.215  The Corps 
has had federal authority over traditional navigable waters tracing 
back to the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act, which 
granted the Corps authority to regulate discharge into “navigable 
waters” that were used or could be used for commerce.216  Further, 
the Agencies’ jurisdiction over interstate waters (waters that cross 
state lines) has historically been part of the Agencies’ regulations, 
and Congress’s definition of “navigable waters” in the CWA explicitly 
includes jurisdiction over “the territorial seas.”217  The Supreme 
Court has also recognized CWA jurisdiction over impoundments of 
jurisdictional waters—waters in sections (a)(1)–(3) that have been 
dammed.218  Accordingly, the Rule does not make any changes to 
CWA jurisdiction for these subcategories.219 
The fifth subcategory, tributaries, also comports with Supreme 
Court precedent.  Federal jurisdiction over tributaries is not novel; 
however, the Rule “makes tributaries . . . that share a ‘significant 
nexus’ to ‘waters of the United States’ jurisdictional by rule.”220  
                                                          
 214. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,058, 37,104 (codified at 33 C.F.R. 
§ 328.3(a)(1)–(6)). 
 215. See S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 370 (2006) 
(upholding jurisdiction over dammed water as a “waters of the United States”); 
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985) (upholding 
the Corps’ regulation, which established CWA jurisdiction over traditionally 
navigable waters, interstate waters, and the territorial seas). 
 216. See supra note 43 (explaining the history of the RHA).  More examples of 
traditional navigable waters under CWA jurisdiction include Great Salt Lake in Utah 
and Lake Minnetonka in Minnesota.  RAPANOS GUIDANCE, supra note 103, at 5 n.20. 
 217. See CWA § 502(7); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2012)) (“The term ‘navigable waters’ 
means the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”); 33 C.F.R. 
§ 323.2(a)(2)(1985) (establishing jurisdiction for “[a]ll interstate waters including 
interstate wetlands”). 
 218. See S.D. Warren Co., 547 U.S. at 379 n.5 (clarifying that one cannot avoid 
jurisdiction by damming or impounding a “water of the United States”); see also 
Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,075 (same). 
 219. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,056 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 328.3; 40 C.F.R. 
§ 122.2) (“Existing regulations (last codified in 1896) define ‘waters of the United 
States’ as traditional navigable waters, interstate waters, all other waters that could 
affect interstate or foreign commerce, impoundments of waters of the United States, 
tributaries, the territorial seas, and adjacent wetlands.”). 
 220. Hogan et al., supra note 186; see Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 129 (“The 
[1975] regulation extends the Corps’ authority under § 404 to all wetlands adjacent 
to navigable or interstate waters and their tributaries.”); TECHNICAL SUPPORT 
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Previously, the Agencies regulated all tributaries without 
restriction.221  The Rule’s key change to the regulation of tributaries 
is that the Agencies define “tributary” for the first time, and thus, 
some tributaries that previously may have been considered on a case-
by-case basis are now considered per se jurisdictional.222  The Rule 
defines “tributary” as a “water that contributes flow, either directly or 
through another water . . . that is characterized by the presence of 
the physical indicators of a bed and banks and an ordinary high water 
mark.”223  Further, a “tributary” can be natural, man-made, or man-
altered and does not lose its status if it has constructed or natural 
breaks, such as “wetlands, along the run of a stream, debris piles, 
boulder fields, or a stream that flows underground.”224 
The Rule’s definition for “tributary” is consistent with Justice 
Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test.225  As Justice Kennedy specified, a 
“significant nexus” connection to navigable or potentially navigable 
water must be present for CWA jurisdiction.226  The Rule’s definition 
of “tributary” requires physical indicators of a “bed and banks” and 
an “ordinary high water mark”227 to ensure the presence of sufficient 
                                                          
DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 24 (referencing the Corps’ 1975 interim regulations 
that “defined navigable waters for the purposes of the [CWA] to include non-
navigable tributaries”). 
 221. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,058. 
 222. See Deborah Freeman & Steve Dougherty, New Clean Water Act Rule Defining 
Waters of the United States, 44 COLO. LAW. 43, 44 (2015) (explaining that intermittent 
tributaries were previously considered “other waters” and were considered on a case-
by-case basis); Hogan et al., supra note 186 (mentioning that the Rule’s definition for 
tributaries “removes a distinction in the [Agencies’] 2008 guidance between 
permanent and intermittent tributaries”); supra notes 171, 182 and accompanying 
text (citing the Rule and describing the new definitions). 
 223. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,105 (codified at 33 C.F.R. 
§ 328.3(c)(3)). 
 224. Id. at 37,105–06.  A tributary may also be considered jurisdictional if “it 
contributes flow through a water of the United States” to a traditionally navigable 
water.  Id. at 37,106. 
 225. See TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 31 (explaining that 
while Justice Kennedy specifically referred to a “significant nexus” with adjacent 
wetlands in Rapanos, the “significant nexus” test is not solely limited to application 
with “adjacent wetlands”). 
 226. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 779 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 227. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,105 (codified at 33 C.F.R. 
§ 328.3(c)(6)).  An “ordinary high water mark” is defined as the “line on the shore 
established by the fluctuations of water and indicated by the physical characteristics 
such as a clear, natural line impressed on the bank, shelving, [and] changes in the 
character of soil.”  Id. at 37,106. 
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and regular “volume, frequency, and duration of flow” of water.228  
Hence, the Agencies defined “tributary” to include physical 
characteristics that demonstrate either consistent surface flow or 
other biological or chemical connections to downstream navigable 
waters.229  These physical characteristics ensure that jurisdictional 
tributaries possess the requisite “significant nexus” connection with 
traditional navigable waters so that jurisdiction is consistent with the 
permissible scope of the “waters of the United States” that the 
Supreme Court outlined in Rapanos.230 
The allegation that the Rule’s per se jurisdiction over tributaries 
does not satisfy the “significant nexus” test misinterprets Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion.231  Justice Kennedy only expressed concern with 
tributaries that did not have a “significant nexus” connection.232  He 
also did not express any disfavor with categorical jurisdiction once 
the Agencies had undergone rulemaking.233  Although Justice 
Kennedy concluded that a “significant nexus” must be present to 
establish jurisdiction, he stipulated that the Agencies could “choose 
to identify categories of tributaries [through regulations or 
adjudication] that, due to their volume of flow,” are “significant 
                                                          
 228. See id. at 37,105–06 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(3)); TECHNICAL SUPPORT 
DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 69–72 (defining “tributary” to include waters where 
there is evidence of a “strong influence on the physical, chemical, and biological 
integrity of downstream waters” consistent with the CWA’s statutory objective). 
 229. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,076; see also TECHNICAL SUPPORT 
DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 70 (explaining the Agencies’ process for identifying 
and concluding that these types of connections were “significant enough” for CWA 
jurisdiction). 
 230. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 779, 786 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (rejecting 
jurisdiction over “waters” that “carry only insubstantial flow” or otherwise have no 
connection to navigable waters). 
 231. See First Amended Complaint at 14–16, Georgia v. EPA, No. 2:15-cv-79, 2015 
WL 5117699 (S.D. Ga. July 20, 2015) (alleging the Rule’s per se jurisdiction over 
tributaries exceeds the permissible scope of CWA jurisdiction). 
 232. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 784 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (expressing concern 
with the Corps establishing jurisdiction over uncertain “surface water connections” 
and his conclusion that the “presence of a hydrologic connection . . . [a]bsent some 
[other] measure” of the “significance of the connection” between the tributaries and 
navigable-in-fact waters was insufficient to establish CWA jurisdiction); see also 
TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 67 (explaining that Justice 
Kennedy “did not raise concerns with the [A]gencies’ existing jurisdiction over 
tributaries themselves”). 
 233. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780, 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that the 
Agencies may “presume covered status for other comparable wetlands [as a matter of 
administrative convenience]”). 
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enough” to be considered jurisdictional.234  This is exactly what the 
Agencies have done:  the Agencies have used Justice Kennedy’s 
“significant nexus” standard to define “tributary” in a manner whereby 
the tributaries’ features will demonstrate the requisite “nexus” for 
jurisdiction.235  Essentially, pursuant to Rapanos, once an Agency finds a 
“significant nexus,” CWA jurisdiction is appropriate.  Therefore, the 
Agencies’ decision to establish this jurisdiction with a per se definition 
comports with the Supreme Court’s decision in Rapanos.236 
Moreover, the claim that the categorical jurisdiction of “tributaries” 
violates the plurality’s standard for a “continuous surface connection” 
under Rapanos is inconsequential.237  No court has held that the 
plurality’s standard is the primary standard for determining CWA 
jurisdiction after Rapanos.238  In fact, the courts that have considered 
the plurality’s standard have used it in combination with Justice 
Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test.239  Thus, if a “water” satisfied either 
test, the courts upheld CWA jurisdiction.240  Therefore, if waters meet 
the definition of “tributary” in the Rule, the fact that a court may not 
find jurisdiction under the plurality’s test is irrelevant because a 
tributary is jurisdictional under the “significant nexus” test.241  
                                                          
 234. Id. at 780–81. 
 235. See TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 70–71 (explaining the 
scientific analysis used to determine the presence of a “significant nexus” with 
navigable waters). 
 236. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 783 (emphasizing that the “significant-nexus test itself 
prevents problematic applications of statute”). 
 237. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 14, Ass’n of Am. R.R.s 
v. EPA, No. 3:15-cv-266 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2015) (claiming that the Rule asserts 
jurisdiction over “water features that do not constitute a ‘continuous surface 
connection’”); First Amended Complaint at 16, Georgia v. EPA, No. 2:15-cv-79, 2015 
WL 5117699 (S.D. Ga. July 20, 2015).  The Rule explains that tributaries with 
intermittent flow may still possess a “significant nexus” with traditional navigable 
waters to be considered jurisdictional under the CWA.  Clean Water Rule:  Definition 
of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,079 (June 29, 2015) 
(codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.). 
 238. Chwee, supra note 66, at 264. 
 239. See supra Section I.C (explaining the different courts of appeals 
interpretations of CWA jurisdiction under Justice Kennedy’s opinion or the 
plurality’s opinion). 
 240. See id. (demonstrating that the plurality’s “surface-water connection” standard 
was always considered with Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” standard; thus, if a 
connection was only found under Justice Kennedy’s standard, that was sufficient for 
CWA jurisdiction). 
 241. See Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,058 (clarifying that the Rule only 
covers tributaries “that meet the significant nexus standard”). 
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Ultimately, any finding that a water does not meet the plurality’s test in 
no way contravenes the Supreme Court’s holding in Rapanos. 
The sixth subcategory, “adjacent waters,” is also consistent with 
Rapanos.  The Rule changes existing jurisdiction in Agency 
regulations from per se jurisdiction over “adjacent wetlands” to per se 
jurisdiction over “adjacent waters.”242  The Rule keeps the existing 
definition of “adjacent wetlands” and reclassifies it as the definition 
for “adjacent waters.”243  “Adjacent waters” include “all waters 
bordering, contiguous to, or ‘neighboring’”244 jurisdictional waters in 
sections (a)(1)–(5),245 including waters separated by constructed or 
natural barriers, such as dikes or beach dunes.246 
The per se jurisdiction of “adjacent waters” in lieu of “adjacent 
wetlands” does not impermissibly expand CWA jurisdiction beyond 
the scope of the CWA that the Supreme Court has already outlined in 
its previous cases.  While Riverside Bayview specifically upheld 
jurisdiction over “adjacent wetlands,” the Court had to determine 
whether the Corps could reasonably interpret the term “navigable 
waters” under the CWA to include “adjacent wetlands.”247  Congress’s 
specific use of the term “navigable waters” indicates that the CWA has 
always had jurisdiction over “waters.”248  Nevertheless, some critics 
have viewed the Rule’s change in terminology from “wetlands” to 
“waters” as an impermissible expansion of CWA jurisdiction.249  
Specifically, the concern is that the Rule expands per se jurisdiction 
                                                          
 242. Hogan et al., supra note 186. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,105 (codified as 33 C.F.R. 
§ 328.3(c)(2)) (defining “neighboring” waters to include “all waters located within 
100 feet of the ordinary high water mark,” “within the 100-year floodplain,” and 
“within 1,500 feet of the high tide line of a water in [sections] (a)(1) or (a)(3)”). 
 245. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (citing Rule sections (a)(1)–(5) 
establishing jurisdiction over traditional navigable waters, interstate waters, territorial 
seas, impoundments, and tributaries). 
 246. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,105 (codified at 33 C.F.R. 
§ 328.3(c)(1)). 
 247. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 134 (1985) 
(considering the “wetlands” question without any debate about the inclusion of 
traditional “waters”). 
 248. CWA § 502(7); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2012) (defining “navigable waters” 
under the CWA); Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133 (acknowledging Congress’s intent 
to cover “navigable waters”). 
 249. Freeman & Dougherty, supra note 222, at 45. 
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to “waters” that were previously considered on a case-by-case basis and 
therefore may not have been found jurisdictional.250 
However, whether a “water” is a “wetland” or a body of water that is 
adjacent to a “water of the United States” listed in sections (a)(1)–
(a)(5) of the Rule should not affect the determination of CWA 
jurisdiction where a “significant nexus” connection is present.251  
Justice Kennedy specified that “[a]bsent more specific regulations,” 
the Agencies “must establish a significant nexus on a case-by-case 
basis . . . to regulate wetlands based on adjacency to non[-]navigable 
tributaries.”252  A literal interpretation of this sentence suggests that 
once the Agencies promulgate specific regulations, case-by-case 
analysis is no longer necessary.  Moreover, the Agencies have followed 
Justice Kennedy’s suggestion to develop more specific regulations—
the Rule—to mitigate against the need for ongoing case-by-case 
analysis.253  The Rule confirms that “adjacent waters” jurisdictional 
under the Rule are “physically, chemically, and biologically 
integrated with downstream traditional navigable waters.”254  
Therefore, the Rule does not expand jurisdiction over any surface 
waters that would not have been found to have a “significant nexus” 
under an individual case-specific review.  The Agencies have 
jurisdiction over these “adjacent waters” regardless of whether they 
continue to evaluate the waters on a case-by-case basis or create a rule 
that establishes per se jurisdiction over the waters. 
Further, the Rule’s new definition of the term “neighboring” 
includes distance limitations, which provide when the Agencies may 
                                                          
 250. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 17, Ass’n of Am. R.R.s 
v. EPA, No. 3:15-cv-266 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2015) (claiming that the Rule’s 
jurisdiction over all “adjacent waters” violates the permissible scope of CWA 
jurisdiction in Rapanos); First Amended Complaint at 17, Georgia v. EPA, No. 2:15-cv-
79, 2015 WL 5117699 (S.D. Ga. July 20, 2015) (arguing that the expansion of per se 
coverage exceeds the Agencies’ authority under the CWA). 
 251. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 779 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (emphasizing Justice Kennedy’s sole focus upon “the existence of a 
significant nexus” connection to establish CWA jurisdiction). 
 252. Id. at 782. 
 253. Id. (detailing that the Agencies could “presume covered status for other 
comparable wetlands [as a matter of administrative convenience]”). 
 254. See TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 275–79 (explaining 
how these waters “can significantly affect downstream traditional navigable waters, 
interstate waters, or the territorial seas”); id. at 162 (indicating that the Science 
Report also supports finding “adjacency” on the basis of functional relationships 
“rather than solely on the basis of geographical proximity to jurisdictional waters”). 
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deem waters per se jurisdictional as “adjacent waters.”255  Despite 
concerns about federal overreach, the distance limitations do not 
expand jurisdiction of “adjacent waters” beyond the scope that the 
Court outlined in Riverside Bayview and Rapanos.256  The Court has 
repeatedly acknowledged the boundary-drawing problem that the 
Agencies have faced in establishing the scope of jurisdiction based on 
adjacency.257  In both Riverside Bayview and Rapanos, the Court noted 
that when the Agencies define the outer limits of CWA jurisdiction, 
the Agencies “must necessarily choose some point at which water 
ends and land begins.”258  In the Rule, the Agencies have concluded 
that functional relationships sufficient to establish a “significant 
nexus connection” with navigable waters occur within these 
distances.259  As such, the Agencies have used reasonable judgment to 
determine the outer limit of jurisdiction for “adjacent waters,” a task 
                                                          
 255. See Clean Water Rule:  Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. 
Reg. 37,054, 37,105 (June 29, 2015) (codified as 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(1)–(2)) 
(defining “adjacent” waters to include “neighboring” waters and defining 
“neighboring” waters to include “[a]ll waters located within 100 feet of the ordinary 
high water mark,” “within the 100-year floodplain,” and “within 1,500 feet of the high 
tide line of a water”).  There is pending litigation alleging that the distance 
limitations included in the Rule violate the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553, because these limitations were not included in the Proposed Rule.  Jonathan 
H. Adler, Sixth Circuit Puts Controversial “Waters of the United States” (WOTUS) Rule on 
Hold, WASH. POST:  VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/10/09/sixth-circuit-puts-controversial-wat 
ers-of-the-united-states-wotus-rule-on-hold.  Notwithstanding this argument, which 
will not be addressed in this Comment, the distance limitations alone do not mean 
that a “significant nexus” may not be found between these waters and a traditional 
navigable water so that jurisdiction would be appropriate. 
 256. But see Dolan & Lucas, supra note 206 (expressing some critics’ concern over 
many borderline waters “being immediately swept in under over-broad definitions” 
using the “significant nexus” standard). 
 257. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742–43 (plurality opinion) (noting that Agencies 
have found it troublesome to determine adjacency based on ecological 
considerations); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132 
(1985) (explaining the difficulty of defining the bounds of regulatory authority for 
adjoining waters). 
 258. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 740 (quoting Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 132); Riverside 
Bayview, 474 U.S. at 132 (recognizing that “[w]here on this continuum [between 
open waters and dry land] to find the limit of ‘waters’ is far from obvious”). 
 259. See TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 298–305 (discussing the 
research and agency expertise that suggest waters within 100 feet “perform critical 
processes and functions”).  The Science Report recognizes that distance is not the 
only factor “that influences connections”; however, it does confirm that “waters” 
within these distance ranges are in a position to “individually and collectively affect 
the integrity of downstream waters.”  Id. at 295–96. 
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that the Court recognized was not only necessary but also extremely 
difficult.260  Presumably under Justice Kennedy’s standard, if a 
“significant nexus” is found with a traditional navigable water, 
jurisdiction would be appropriate regardless of the distance from the 
outer limits of the “waters” listed in sections (a)(1)–(5).261  Therefore, 
the per se definition of “adjacent waters” and the incorporation of 
distance limitations into the Rule’s definition does not exceed the 
scope of permissible CWA jurisdiction that the Court outlined in 
Riverside Bayview and Rapanos. 
Overall, the Agencies have provided the regulated public with 
additional clarity about the scope of CWA jurisdiction by defining 
what constitutes a “tributary,” including “adjacent waters” as a per se 
category, and establishing bright-line boundaries of jurisdiction for 
these “waters.”  Previously, all tributaries, which were undefined, were 
either jurisdictional or considered on a case-by-case basis.262  Thus, by 
defining “tributary,” the Agencies have given the public a precise 
definition so the public can better understand what “tributaries” will 
be considered jurisdictional under the CWA.263  Additionally, 
following Rapanos, many “adjacent waters” still required a lengthy and 
                                                          
 260. See Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,081 (explaining that the Agencies 
have “established boundaries that are, in their judgment, reasonable and consistent 
with the statute”).  Further, the Rule’s adoption of distance limitations can be 
distinguished from the “complacent acceptance” of distance limitations critiqued by 
the plurality in Rapanos due to the scientific substantiation in the Science Report.  
Compare Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 746 (“Riverside Bayview . . . provides no support for the 
dissent’s complacent acceptance of the Corps’ definition of ‘adjacent,’ which . . . has 
extended beyond reason to include . . . the 100-year floodplain of covered waters.”), 
with TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 294–305 (finding that waters 
within these distances are “integrally linked to the chemical, physical, or biological 
functions of waters to which they are adjacent and downstream to the traditional 
navigable waters”). 
 261. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 783–85 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (announcing that 
“as exemplified by SWANCC, the significant-nexus test itself prevents problematic 
applications of the statute”).  In SWANCC, the Court emphasized that “[i]t was the 
significant nexus between the wetlands and ‘navigable waters’” that permitted 
jurisdiction in Riverside Bayview.  Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty.  v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 168 (2001).  Thus, presumably, if a “significant nexus” 
had been present in SWANCC, the Court would have found the isolated ponds to be 
within CWA jurisdiction regardless of their distance with navigable water. 
 262. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,058 (explaining that the existing 
regulations regulated “all tributaries without qualification”).  See supra note 222 and 
accompanying text (describing the Agencies’ former distinction between 
intermittent and permanent tributaries). 
 263. See Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,079 (describing the physical 
characteristics that must be present for CWA jurisdiction over a “tributary”). 
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time-consuming case-by-case analysis.264  The new Rule includes 
“adjacent waters” in the former per se category of “adjacent 
wetlands,” and the public has the “bright-line boundaries” it 
requested during the notice and comment period to limit federal 
regulation over these “waters.”265  These per se categories will not 
only clarify the Agencies’ regulations but will also help streamline 
Agency review of permit applications and provide more consistent 
regulation of the CWA to the benefit of both the Agencies and the 
regulated public.266 
2. Waters that are not jurisdictional:  Exclusions 
The Rule maintains all of the Agencies’ “regulatory exclusions,” 
which enumerate the waters that will not be considered “waters of the 
United States.”267  In fact, compared with existing regulations, the 
Rule expands the list of exclusions, thereby reducing the scope of 
CWA jurisdiction.268  The Agencies have explained that “[a]ll existing 
exclusions from the definition of ‘waters of the United States’ are 
retained, and several exclusions reflecting longstanding [A]gencies’ 
practice are added to the regulation for the first time.”269  Some of 
these new bright-line exclusions include erosional features (such as 
gullies), artificial reflecting pools, groundwater, puddles, and three 
types of ditches.270 
The Agencies’ failure to exclude all ditches from CWA jurisdiction 
falls within the Rapanos Court’s interpretation of the scope of the 
CWA.  The Rule redefines and clarifies the type of ditches that are 
excluded from CWA jurisdiction, and in certain circumstances, a ditch 
may be considered jurisdictional.271  Specifically, a ditch will fall under 
                                                          
 264. Hogan et. al, supra note 186. 
 265. See Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,057 (referencing many comments 
urging the Agencies to provide more bright-line boundaries to make it easier to 
identify jurisdictional “adjacent waters”). 
 266. See id. at 37,056 (discussing how “case-specific jurisdictional analysis . . . can 
result in inconsistent interpretation of CWA jurisdiction”). 
 267. See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text (specifying the waters codified 
at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) that will not be considered “waters of the United States”). 
 268. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,055.  The Rule also excludes “some 
waters that were previously considered jurisdictional on a case-specific basis.”  
Freeman & Dougherty, supra note 222, at 45. 
 269. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,073. 
 270. Id. at 37,098 (listing the regulatory exclusions that have been added or 
modified). 
 271. Id. at 37,078, 37,097. 
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CWA jurisdiction if it meets both (1) the definition of “tributary”272 and 
(2) is not one of the three types of ditches that are expressly excluded 
in the Rule.273  This exclusion has been one of the most controversial 
provisions of the Rule among regulated industry groups.274 
The Rule explains when the Agencies may consider ditches 
jurisdictional.  To be held jurisdictional, a ditch must meet the 
definition of “tributary,” and, as previously discussed, that definition 
includes physical characteristics, such as an “ordinary high water 
mark,” which demonstrate the presence of a “significant nexus” 
connection with navigable waters.275  The Science Report expresses 
how perennial, intermittent, or ephemeral streams may have a 
“significant nexus” connection with traditional navigable water.276  
Under the Rule’s definition, isolated ditches without a “significant 
nexus” connection, or ditches with only a shallow hydrologic linkage 
to navigable water, are not jurisdictional.277  Thus, Justice Kennedy’s 
concerns about the Agencies establishing CWA jurisdiction over these 
types of tenuous surface connections are not at issue.  Ultimately, if 
the ditch qualifies as a “tributary” and possesses a “significant nexus,” 
it meets Justice Kennedy’s standard for CWA jurisdiction in 
Rapanos.278 
                                                          
 272. A ditch will fall under CWA jurisdiction when it (1) has “a bed and banks and 
ordinary high water mark” and (2) “contribut[es] flow directly or indirectly through 
another water to a traditional navigable water, interstate water, or territorial seas.”  
Id. at 37,078. 
 273. Id.  The types of ditches that are excluded are ditches that are not excavated 
in a tributary, do not relocate a tributary, and do not drain a wetland.  Id. at 37,105 
(codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)(3)). 
 274. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 15, Ass’n of Am. R.R.s v. 
EPA, No. 3:15-cv-266 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2015) (claiming that the Rule’s jurisdiction 
over certain ditches violates the scope of CWA jurisdiction as discussed in Rapanos). 
 275. See supra notes 220–41 and accompanying text (explaining how the Agencies 
used Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” standard to define “tributary” in a manner 
that it will possess the requisite “nexus” for jurisdiction); see also Clean Water Rule, 80 
Fed. Reg. at 37,098 (discussing why ditches that relocate streams are not excluded 
and how a ditch can affect the “natural functions performed by wetlands”). 
 276. See Clear Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,076 (clarifying how “tributaries 
regardless of flow duration are very effective at transporting pollutants 
downstream . . . which impact the integrity and character of traditional navigable 
waters, interstate waters, and the territorial seas”); Technical Support Document, 
supra note 166, at 259–60. 
 277. See id. at 37,078 (noting that ditches must meet the definition of “tributary, 
having a bed and banks and ordinary high water mark, and contributing flow directly 
or indirectly through another water to a traditional navigable water”). 
 278. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 779 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (holding that “jurisdiction over wetlands depends upon the existence of 
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Current beliefs that the Agencies’ regulation of ditches violates 
Supreme Court precedent appear to take Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
out of context.  Petitioners currently challenging the Rule’s validity 
have cited Justice Kennedy’s concern about the expansion of CWA 
jurisdiction to cover ditches that are isolated from navigable-in-fact 
waters or carry insubstantial surface flow to these navigable waters as 
indicative of his disapproval of CWA jurisdiction over all types of 
ditches.279  However, this is not the case.  Justice Kennedy did not 
express concern over regulating ditches in general.  In fact, he 
emphasized the plurality’s rejection of authority over “man-made 
drainage ditches” as “dismissive of the interests asserted by the United 
States in these cases.”280  His concern with isolated waters and waters 
with “insubstantial flow” stemmed from the lack of a requisite “nexus” 
to navigable water.281  At no point did Justice Kennedy indicate that a 
shallow surface connection will never have a “significant nexus” for 
CWA jurisdiction.282  He simply warned that a “mere hydrologic 
connection” may be “too insubstantial” to establish the required 
“nexus with navigable waters.”283  Yet, once the requisite “nexus” is 
established, jurisdiction would be appropriate.  Accordingly, the 
Rule’s jurisdiction over ditches that qualify as “tributaries” adheres to 
Justice Kennedy’s decision in Rapanos. 
Moreover, the Rule’s express exclusions provide clear bright-line 
categories to help the public understand the types of waters that will 
never be considered jurisdictional under the CWA.  While the 
                                                          
a significant nexus between the [waters] in question and navigable waters in the 
traditional sense”).  Further, ditches have been held to be jurisdictional by all of the 
Circuit Courts of Appeals.  See TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 73 
(listing decisions by the circuit courts of appeals that have held that “a man-made 
ditch can be a ‘tributary’ of the downstream waters to which the ditch ultimately 
contributes flow”). 
 279. See First Amended Complaint at 11, Georgia v. EPA, No. 2:15-cv-79, 2015 WL 
5117699 (S.D. Ga. July 20, 2015) (raising Justice Kennedy’s concern that the 
“Agency’s position would impermissibly ‘permit federal regulation whenever 
wetlands lie alongside a ditch or drain, however remote and insubstantial, that 
eventually may flow into traditional navigable waters’” (quoting Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 
778 (Kennedy, J., concurring))). 
 280. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 777 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 281. See id. at 784–86 (explaining that a “ditch could just as well be located many 
miles from any navigable-in-fact water and carry only insubstantial flow toward it” so 
“[a] more specific inquiry, based on the significant[-]nexus standard, is therefore 
necessary”). 
 282. See id. at 784 (rejecting the determination of a “significant nexus” connection 
from a “mere hydrological connection” without further review). 
 283. Id. at 784–85. 
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Agencies did not exclude every ditch from jurisdiction, the Rule does 
expressly exclude three types of ditches and several other types of 
waters that were either previously considered jurisdictional on a case-
by-case basis or were excluded in Agency practice but never expressly 
excluded in the Agencies’ regulations.284  Therefore, the Agencies’ 
expansion of the “regulated exclusions” in the Rule should provide 
the regulated public with additional clarity and reassurance about 
which “waters” will never require CWA permits.285 
3. Waters to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis under the “significant 
 nexus” test 
The last category includes two types of waters in sections (a)(7) and 
(a)(8) of the Rule over which the Agencies may find jurisdiction after a 
case-specific analysis;286 these categories also comport with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Rapanos.  Prior to this Rule, most of these 
“waters” fell under the category of “other waters” in existing 
regulations.287  The Agencies have determined that these waters do not 
always possess a “significant nexus” with traditional navigable waters 
appropriate for per se jurisdiction, so the Agencies have decided that 
these categories of waters must be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.288 
The first category in section (a)(7) includes five types of waters that 
the Agencies have found to be “similarly situated”289 and must be 
                                                          
 284. See supra note 273 (describing the types of ditches that will never be found 
jurisdictional); Freeman & Dougherty, supra note 222, at 45 (explaining the changes 
to exclusions in the Rule). 
 285. Clean Water Rule:  Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 
37,054, 37,097 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts of 40 
C.F.R.) (noting that “[t]he majority of commenters requested that the [A]gencies’ 
ditch exclusion be clarified or broadened”).  The Agencies also added an express 
exclusion for “puddles,” and “farm ponds, log cleaning ponds, and cooling ponds to 
the list of excluded ponds in the [R]ule based on public comments.”  Id. at 37,099. 
 286. Id. at 37,104–05 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7)–(8)). 
 287. Hogan et al., supra note 186 (explaining the change to this category in the 
Rule). 
 288. See TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 331 (citing the Science 
Report’s conclusion that “current science does not support evaluations of the degree 
of connectivity for specific groups or classes of wetlands,” but “[e]valuations of 
individual wetlands or groups of wetlands, however, could be possible through case-
by-case analysis” (quoting Connectivity of Streams & Wetlands to Downstream Waters, EPA 
(2015), at ES-4, https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/risk/recordisplay.cfm?deid=296414&C 
FID=67575455&CFTOKEN=91277579)). 
 289. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,104–05 (codified at 33 
C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7)).  These waters include prairie potholes (shallow wetlands), 
Carolina and Delmarva bays (shallow lakes, wetlands, and depressions), pocosins 
(swamps in upland coastal region), western vernal pools in California (seasonal 
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combined together for the purpose of analyzing whether a “significant 
nexus” is present.290  If one “similarly situated” water is found to have a 
“significant nexus” with a traditional navigable water, all of the “similarly 
situated” waters in the region are considered to be jurisdictional.291 
The second category in section (a)(8) consists of waters (a) within 
the 100-year floodplain292 of a traditional navigable water, interstate 
water, or territorial sea; or (b) all waters within 4,000 feet of the high 
tide line293 or ordinary high water mark of one of these traditionally 
jurisdictional waters.294  The Agencies may review the effect of these 
waters either individually or together.295  Unlike the first category, this 
category requires a determination of whether to combine the 
“waters” for the Agencies’ “significant nexus” analysis.296 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion permits the Rule’s case-specific 
categories.  In Rapanos, Justice Kennedy expressly stated that “the 
[Agencies] must establish a significant nexus on a case-by-case basis 
when seeking to regulate wetlands based on adjacency to 
nonnavigable tributaries.”297  The Rule specifies that the Agencies 
must find a “significant nexus” on a case-by-case basis for these 
                                                          
depressional wetlands), and Texas coastal prairie wetlands.  Id. at 37,105.  The Rule 
states that these “subcategories are similarly situated because they perform similar 
functions and they are located sufficiently close to each other to function together in 
affecting downstream waters.”  Id. at 37,071.  Accordingly, these waters are 
“sufficiently near each other . . . to function as an integrated habitat.”  Id. 
 290. Id. at 37,104 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7)).  Under the Rule, these 
types of “waters” must be considered in “combination with all waters of the same 
subcategory [e.g., only pocosins may be analyzed with other pocosins] in the region.” 
Id. at 37,087 (emphasis added). 
 291. Id. at 37,095. The region is “the watershed that drains to the nearest 
traditional navigable water, interstate water, or the territorial seas through a single 
point of entry.” Id. at 37,091. 
 292. See supra note 178 (defining the “100-year flood plain” as “the area with a one 
percent annual chance of flooding”). 
 293. The “high tide line” is the “line of intersection of the land with the water’s 
surface at the maximum height reached by a rising tide.”  Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. 
Reg. at 37,106 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(7)). 
 294. Id. at 37,105 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(8)). 
 295. Id. at 37,095.  The Agencies “have not determined that such waters are 
categorically similarly situated,” so the Agencies will conduct a determination to see 
whether they are “similarly situated” for the purpose of being combined.  Id. 
 296. Id.  Waters will be combined as “similarly situated” when they “function alike 
and are sufficiently close to function together in affecting downstream waters.”  Id. 
 297. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 782 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(explaining that “this showing is necessary to avoid unreasonable applications of the 
statute”). 
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categories of water.298  Thus, these categories satisfy Justice Kennedy’s 
requisite standard of review to properly establish CWA jurisdiction. 
Further, the combination of “similarly situated” waters also adheres 
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Rapanos.  Justice Kennedy clearly 
indicated that the “requisite nexus” would be met “if the wetlands 
either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the 
region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, [or] biological 
integrity” of other “waters.”299  The Science Report concludes that 
certain types of “waters” act together in regions and may significantly 
affect traditional navigable waters.300  Using the Report’s findings of 
“comparable” or “similarly situated” waters, the Agencies identified 
which subcategories of “waters” they should review together when 
assessing the presence of a “significant nexus.”301 
Additionally, dispute over the Rule’s combination of “similarly 
situated” waters in a region misconstrues Justice Kennedy’s opinion.  
Specifically, the argument that the Agencies need to find a 
“significant nexus” to each similarly situated water is incorrect.302  
This is not the standard that Justice Kennedy proposed in Rapanos.303  
Rather, in Rapanos, Justice Kennedy stated that the “requisite nexus” 
would be met “if the wetlands, either alone or in combination with 
similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect . . . other 
covered waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’”304  Ultimately, his 
focus was the effect on the connection to “navigable water,” not 
between each type of “water” found to be “similarly situated.” 
                                                          
 298. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,105–06 (codified at 33 C.F.R. 
§ 328.3(c)(7)–(8)). 
 299. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 300. TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 331 (explaining that 
certain waters “have a similar influence on the physical, chemical, and biological 
integrity of downstream waters and are similarly situated on the landscape”). 
 301. See id. at 330–49 (explaining the scientific analysis behind the categories of 
waters that are considered “similarly situated” in the Rule). 
 302. See First Amended Complaint at 21, Georgia v. EPA, No. 2:15-cv-79, 2015 WL 
5117699 (S.D. Ga. July 20, 2015) (arguing that the Rule “violates Justice Kennedy’s 
test because Justice Kennedy would only permit the Agencies to assert jurisdiction over 
a water that ‘significantly affect[s] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of 
other covered waters,’”  and that “Justice Kennedy’s test would not permit aggregation 
of waters across amorphous ‘region[s],’ as the Rule asserts the Agencies will do” 
(citations omitted) (quoting Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 717 (Kennedy, J., concurring))). 
 303. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 779 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (focusing on a 
“significant nexus between the wetlands in question and navigable waters in the 
traditional sense” (emphasis added)). 
 304. Id. at 780 (emphasis added). 
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Moreover, Justice Kennedy clearly indicated that “[w]here an 
adequate nexus is established for a particular wetland, it may be 
permissible as a matter of administrative convenience or necessity, to 
presume covered status for other comparable wetlands in the region.”305  
Agencies have made precisely this presumption:  they have used the 
Science Report to presume covered status for certain categories of 
“waters” that the Report found to be “comparable” or “similarly 
situated” once Agency officials have determined that a “significant 
nexus” connection is present.306  In addition, the Rule follows Justice 
Kennedy’s instruction to review this effect on a case-by-case basis.307  
Evidently, these sections of the Rule follow Justice Kennedy’s 
standard proposed in Rapanos. 
Overall, the Rule’s case-specific categories clarify and limit the 
application of the “significant nexus” test that could otherwise be very 
broad.  Without such categories, the Agencies could potentially find a 
“significant nexus” with any traditional navigable water.  That 
potential breadth is the very issue that concerned many critics of the 
Rule’s incorporation of Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test.308  
While there is disagreement over the distance limitations that the 
Rule imposes, these limits provide some of the bright-line boundaries 
that the regulated public requested from the Agencies and also serve 
as a limit to federal jurisdiction of U.S. waters.309  Further, the specific 
sections of the Rule that require case-specific analysis limit this 
analysis to only these two types of “waters,” and this limitation will 
allow Agency officials to apply the CWA more consistently and 
provide clarity for those confused about CWA permit jurisdiction.  
                                                          
 305. Id. at 782 (emphasis added). 
 306. See Clean Water Rule:  Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. 
Reg. 37,054, 37,095 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts 
of 40 C.F.R.) (explaining that “[a] positive ‘significant nexus’ determination 
would . . . apply to all similarly situated waters within the point of the watershed”). 
 307. See id. at 37,104–06 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7)–(8)) (requiring case-
specific review for categories (a)(7) and (a)(8)).  Further, all of the courts of appeals 
have agreed that a “nexus” may be formed by a non-navigable water alone or in 
combination with other similarly situated waters in the region.  TECHNICAL SUPPORT 
DOCUMENT, supra note 166, at 44. Thus, permit seekers should not be surprised by 
this provision in the Rule. 
 308. Freeman & Dougherty, supra note 222, at 47 (expressing concern that the 
“significant nexus” test is overly expansive and allows federal overreach for these 
“waters”). 
 309. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,082 (noting requests for a “specific 
floodplain interval or other limitation . . . to more clearly identify the outer limit”).  
This Comment assumes that the science that has found these distance limitations to 
be appropriate is valid. 
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Ultimately, not only does the Rule provide more clarity about the 
“waters of the United States,” but it also comports with the Supreme 
Court’s precedent concerning the permissible scope of the CWA. 
CONCLUSION 
The Clean Water Rule is a response to hundreds of requests for 
clarification on the scope of the “waters of the United States” under 
the CWA.  While the Rule has become extremely controversial due to 
its per se jurisdiction of tributaries and “adjacent waters,” it does not 
unilaterally expand the CWA or constitute federal overreach.  The 
Rule comports with the Supreme Court’s decisions in Riverside 
Bayview, SWANCC, and Rapanos.  The Rule follows Justice Kennedy’s 
framework of “significant nexus” in Rapanos and uses his criteria to 
develop a Rule such that the Agencies may only find jurisdiction 
when a “significant nexus” is present.  Accordingly, the Rule is a 
rational convergence, which reflects Congress’ intent, a combination 
of Supreme Court precedent, the most recent science, Agency 
practice, and public comments.  While the Rule may not be the 
easiest to decipher, it does address many of the regulated public’s 
requests for greater clarity by defining previously undefined terms 
and establishing bright-line boundaries.  The public can use these 
clarifications as a tool for guidance to better determine which waters 
fall under CWA jurisdiction.  Further, the Rule creates a structure for 
streamlined review, which will lead to more consistent application of 
the CWA to the benefit of both the Agencies and regulated public. 
Overall, this Rule is what the public needs, and it provides a logical 
definition of “waters of the United States” consistent with Congress’s 
goal for the CWA.  If smaller streams and wetlands that have an effect 
on traditional navigable waters are not protected, individuals will be 
able to discharge pollutants, undermining the purpose of the CWA.  
Nevertheless, the Rule is currently subject to nationwide litigation, 
and the future of the Rule remains uncertain. 
The Rule will inevitably make its way to the Supreme Court for 
review.  With the recent passing of Justice Scalia, who vehemently 
criticized expansive environmental and wetland regulation, the 
Court’s new composition will likely impact the Rule’s fate.  However, 
the Agencies have followed the permissible scope of CWA jurisdiction 
that the Supreme Court outlined in its previous cases.  Consequently, 
the Court should uphold the Clean Water Rule. 
 
